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In Pursuit of Good & Gold: Data Observations of
Employee Ownership & Impact Investment
Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto &
Anne M. Tucker*
ABSTRACT
A startup’s path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and
most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these
odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees’ incentives
to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance
the goal of profitability with another goal—the goal of good—the risks are
likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are
threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals
adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore
contracting terms specific to impact investing funds and their portfolio
companies. We observe one possible private ordering mechanism to
balance and align interests to serve both goals: employee ownership.
Traditional VC investments confront contracting challenges as the
portfolio companies and investors balance their interests, which may not
align. Additionally, portfolio companies are contracting with their own
employees. The VC contracting literature identifies several agency costs
that contractual terms can address. Contracts can help attract the right
employees, then encourage them to work, stay, and share their best ideas.
But, the existing literature addresses traditional agency costs with respect
to the pursuit of a single monetary goal. Impact investment funds that
balance monetary goals, short-term or long, with other goals may strike a
different balance in negotiating with companies. We examine how the
introduction of new motivations and interests into a precarious negotiation
process shapes contracting outcomes.
We address this question empirically by analyzing the role of
employee stock ownership in impact investment fund contracts when
investing in targeted portfolio companies. That a startup’s employees
might receive shares and options is uncontroversial. Indeed, this appears
in many ways to be fundamental to today’s startup culture. Might impact
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investors mandate that employees own shares as a means to balance dual
goals? That is the key question for our analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Employee ownership is a source of corporate governance optimism.
It can help recruit and retain better employees, and it can neutralize agency
costs by aligning employees’ and other shareholders’ interests.
High-profile tech companies like Facebook and Twitter, and fictional ones
like those depicted in the show Silicon Valley, associate tech employment
with ownership.1 Outside of the tech world, established, large-scale
*

Christopher Geczy, Academic Director, Wharton Wealth Management Initiative, Director of Jacobs
Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Research; Jessica S. Jeffers, Ph.D. candidate,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; Anne M. Tucker, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia
State University College of Law; David K. Musto, Ronald O. Perelman Professor in Finance &
Department Chair, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. David Musto is also an economist at
the Securities Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
of the authors colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 895, 901 (2014) (describing salaries within technology startups and requiring less
capital than other initial costs because “significant portions of compensation will be through stock
grants and options”); see also Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK.
L. REV. 1163, 1220 (2013) (describing stock options and grants generally).
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companies like Whole Foods,2 Starbucks,3 and Chobani4 boast strong
employee ownership programs.
Impact investing is a source of optimism about society’s potential
benefit from profit-seeking firms and investment funds. In the impact
sector, venture capital (VC) partnerships aim to produce societal benefits
alongside monetary returns by seeking out portfolio companies dedicated
to both goals.5 The importance of the nonmonetary goal in impact
investing raises the question of whether employee ownership plays the
same role as it does when only profits are sought. We address this question
in our Article. In reviewing 100 contracts and preliminary contracts, we
observe a relatively high incidence of employee ownership plans as a deal
term, a condition, of the joint agreement for the impact fund to invest and
for the portfolio company to accept the financing. That is, the investors
appear to not only allow but also require portfolio companies to encourage
employee share ownership. This finding raises further questions. Are
employee ownership programs compatible with small-scale companies in
emerging or developing economies? Can employee ownership programs
further additional ends in the unique context of impact investment, such as
fostering social and employee quality of life benefits? Who benefits from
the creation of employee ownership plans: portfolio companies or impact
funds?
In this Article, we examine the intersection of shared employee
ownership, private equity/venture capitalism, and impact investments.
Drawing upon a unique data set of impact investment fund survey
responses and voluntarily supplied documents, we examine shared
2. About Our Benefits, WHOLE FOODS, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/careers/about-ourbenefits [https://perma.cc/2JXL-U2GW]. “All of our full-time and part-time team members are
eligible to receive stock options through annual leadership grants or through service-hour grants once
they have accumulated 6,000 service hours (approximately three years of full-time employment).
Approximately 95% of the equity awards granted under the Company’s stock plan since its inception
in 1992 have been granted to team members who are not executive officers. In fiscal year 2013, more
than 14,000 team members exercised over 4 million stock options worth approximately $120 million
in gains before taxes, or an average of about $8,400 per team member.” Form 10-K, WHOLE FOODS,
https://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/sites/default/files/media/Global/Company%20Info/PDFs/WFM
-2013-10-K.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5TL-LH9Z ] (describing the stock ownership plan).
3. 2014 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Bean Stock: A Program that Turned Employees into
Partners Continues to Change Lives, STARBUCKS, https://news.starbucks.com/2014annualmeeting/
program-that-turned-employees-into-partners [https://perma.cc/MNG9-RLRD].
4. Jena McGregor, How Chobani CEO Ensures That Employees Will Share in the Company’s
Success, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-on-leadership-chobani20160430-story.html [https://perma.cc/6639-NLX3]; see also Stephanie Strom, At Chobani, Now It’s
Not Just the Yogurt That’s Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/27/business/a-windfall-for-chobani-employees-stakes-in-the-company.html?_r=0.
5. ANTHONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 8 (1st ed. 2011) (describing impact investment funds
as optimistic and action-oriented).
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ownership from the point of view of the funds through a contract theory
lens.
Within our study, we found that contractual terms, particularly
regarding employee share ownership, cluster by fund. This clustering
suggests that, to some extent, funds drive the observed commitment to
employee ownership. When surveyed, fund managers’ responses suggest
that employee ownership is compatible with impact investment
objectives.6 We offer several hypotheses for the motive at the portfolio
company and fund level to include employee ownership schemes. Through
extensive cross-sectional analysis, we investigate the various employee
ownership theories, offer preliminary observations gleaned from our
sample, and suggest future areas of research in this new field.
The existing shared ownership literature focuses on employee
ownership in startups, best practices in implementing employee ownership
programs, and the benefits of employee ownership plans such as
recruitment, retention, and performance. The private equity and VC
literature focuses on mechanisms of contract to structure investment and
financial incentives at the fund level and the portfolio company level.7 The
private equity and VC literature, however, is mostly silent on funds
contracting for shared ownership in portfolio companies.8 The impact
investment literature, the most nascent of the fields both in terms of
practice and study, is largely dominated by industry and grant-funded
research-backed in part by financial intermediaries with impact investment
products available. Our Article adds to the existing employee ownership
literature by building out the fund’s perspective and interest in shared
ownership. It also adds to the existing private equity and VC literature by
examining shared ownership and to the emerging impact investment
literature by providing an extensive academic review of a large set of
contracts in this space.
Our Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we introduce impact
investment for those unfamiliar with the topic. In Part II, we provide a
brief overview of employee ownership structures. In Part III, we state the
various hypotheses for company and fund preferences for employee
ownership and introduce predictions for data observations. In Part IV, we
state our methodology and review our sample. In Part V, we introduce
survey and document review results. In Part VI, we discuss the limitations
6. Survey responses on file with authors.
7. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928).
8. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUDIES 281 (2003)
[hereinafter Kaplan & Stomberg, 2003]; Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Characteristics,
Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177 (2004) [hereinafter
Kaplan & Stomberg, 2004].
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of our study, share our observations and insights from this study, and
outline future work.
I. IMPACT INVESTMENT
Impact investments—investments made with the intention of
generating social and environmental impact alongside financial
gains9—account for more than $77 billion USD.10 While it is only a
fraction of the more than $200 trillion financial market,11 impact investing
is a growing investment strategy12 that is attracting major market players
to the space.13 For example, in 2015, major private equity players—
BlackRock Inc. and Bain Capital LP—launched new impact investment
funds.14
Financial industry groups and foundations have significantly
contributed information about and knowledge of impact investment
challenges, statistics, and trends.15 Several academic studies of social
9. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. & GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, INTRODUCING THE IMPACT
INVESTING BENCHMARK, at i (2015), http://40926u2govf9kuqen1ndit018su-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Introducing-the-Impact-Investing-Benchmark.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XW2-DTGV] [hereinafter GIIN, BENCHMARK]; see also GLOB. IMPACT
INVESTING NETWORK, IMPACTBASE SNAPSHOT: AN ANALYSIS OF 300+ IMPACT INVESTING FUNDS 7
(2015), https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/ImpactBaseSnapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TG4YTSA]. To qualify as an impact investment, the “intention” for proactive impact must be matched
with measurable outcomes. SEAN GREENE, A SHORT GUIDE TO IMPACT INVESTING 4, 10 (2015),
http://casefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Short-Guide-Oct2015-Digital-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VCW-VSVK].
10. GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK RESEARCH TEAM, 2016 ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR
SURVEY 12 (2016), https://thegiin.org/assets/2016%20GIIN%20Annual%20Impact%20Investor
%20Survey_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN55-HY7R] (estimating $77.4 billion USD in impact
investment assets managed by 156 survey respondents) [hereinafter GIIN, 2016 SURVEY]. A similar
study conducted in 2015 reported that 146 who responded managed a total of $60 billion USD.
YASEMIN SALTUK ET AL., EYES ON THE HORIZON: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY, (2015)
https://thegiin.org/knowledge/publication/eyes-on-the-horizon
[https://perma.cc/EH8F-62NW]
[hereinafter GIIN, 2015 SURVEY].
11. U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY BD. ON IMPACT INVESTING, PRIVATE CAPITAL PUBLIC GOOD: HOW
SMART FEDERAL POLICY CAN GALVANIZE IMPACT INVESTING—AND WHY IT’S URGENT 4 (2014),
http://www.nabimpactinvesting.org/ [https://perma.cc/MD6P-GHX4].
12. MANUEL STAGARS, IMPACT INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR FRONTIER MARKETS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 8 (2015).
13. For example, Zurich Insurance and AXA Group entered the impact investing market in the
last several years. GIIN, 2016 SURVEY, supra note 10, at 4.
14. Id. See also Landon Thomas, Jr., At BlackRock, a Wall Street Rock Star’s $5 Trillion
Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/business/dealbook/atblackrock-shaping-the-shifts-in-power.html (describing BlackRock as the world’s largest asset
manager); Michael J. de la Merced, Ex-Governor Will Lead New Fund at Bain Capital, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/ex-governor-will-lead-new-fund-atbain-capital.html?_r=0 (describing Bain Capital as one of “the biggest and best-known private equity
firms, with roughly $65 billion in assets under management”).
15. See, e.g., GIIN, BENCHMARK, supra note 9 (studying fifty-one impact funds and reporting
financial returns and descriptive statistics); see also GREENE, supra note 9.
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enterprise have been published in the last five years,16 but to date few have
focused specifically on impact investment.17 Our academic study adds to
the existing body of literature by focusing on impact investment
contracting norms generally, and in this Article, specifically examining the
role of and preference for employee ownership.
Impact investing describes an investment strategy, not an asset
class.18 Impact investments avoid allocating capital to companies that
“induce harm for society or the environment.”19 But negative screening,
alone, is insufficient to qualify an investment as “impact.”20 Impact
investing focuses on early-stage investing to bring companies with impact
goals to economic viability and produce blended value.21 Investments
typically achieve impact or blended value22 through product impact23 or
operational impact. To illustrate the following, consider a company whose
intended social benefit is embedded in its product and business model, for
example a cook stove designed to reduce toxic exhaust in low-income
households. Alternatively, a company’s impact could lie in its operations
through higher wages paid to coffee pickers, through distribution of the
product to the neediest, or through pricing it below top market rates.
Stringent definitions of impact focus on benefit generated above what the
16. See, e.g., Robert T. Esposito, Charitable Solicitation Acts: Maslow’s Hammer for Regulating
Social Enterprise, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 463, 469 (2015) (examining the intersection of charitable
solicitation acts and social enterprise forms); see also Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law
Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 771 (2015) (examining social enterprise through new governance
theory and similar self-regulatory principles).
17. Deborah Burand, Resolving Impact Investment Disputes: When Doing Good Goes Bad, 48
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 67–68 (2015) (describing dispute resolution in impact investment);
Bhagwan Chowdhry et al., Incentivizing Impact Investing (May 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2437238 (providing a model theoretical foundation for funding impact
investments through Social Impact Bonds to discourage over investment, or Social Impact Guarantees
to discourage under investment); Uli Grabenwarter, The Gamma Model for Impact Measurement in
Fund Investments (Apr. 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381129
(discussing measurement obstacles for impact investments); Karen E. Wilson et al., Social Impact
Investment: Building the Evidence Base (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2562082 (proposing a framework for assessing the social impact investment market and
focusing on the need to build the evidence base).
18. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 9. Impact investing has “animated a generation of entrepreneurs
and captured the imagination of world leaders. It links the social consciousness of philanthropy with
the market principles of business. It’s about how the power of markets can help to scale solutions to
some of our most urgent problems.” U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY BD. ON IMPACT INVESTING, supra note
11, at 4.
19. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 9.
20. Paul Brest & Kelly Born, Unpacking the Impact in Impact Investing, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://ssir.org/articles/entry/unpacking_the_impact_in_impact_
investing [https://perma.cc/K4JR-P5GN].
21. BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 5, at 10 (“If impact investing is what we do, blended
value is what we produce.”).
22. GREENE, supra note 9, at 4.
23. Brest & Born, supra note 20.
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market would have otherwise produced, a concept coined additionality.24
While definitions and practices vary, impact investors generally seek
business ideas that depart in an important and potentially measurable way
from practices associated with maximizing profit. Common impact themes
are job creation and quality, economic development through
infrastructure, financial inclusion such as microfinance, sustainable living
through access to healthy and environmentally friendly products,
agriculture businesses, and education access and outcomes.25
The provision of capital may, itself, be a benefit if the investment
provides additional capital or capital at a lower cost than the portfolio
company could get in the traditional financial market. Capital benefits
include: (i) price—below market investments, (ii) pledge—loan
guarantees, (iii) position—subordinated debt or equity positions, (iv)
patience—longer locked-in terms before exit, (v) purpose—capital
adaptable to the portfolio company’s needs, and (vi) perspicacity—
discerning opportunities that traditional finance markets overlook.26
Impact investments also pursue financial returns. The question is
how much? Impact investments can seek concessionary returns—an
intentional sacrifice of market-based returns to achieve greater social or
environmental impact—or nonconcessionary returns attempting to match
risk-adjusted market rates.27 A 2015 Global Impact Investing Network
(GIIN) study of fifty-one benchmark impact funds launched between 1998
and 2004 reported 6.9% returned to investors.28 The same study results,
when limited to funds under $100 million and launched between 1998 and
2010, reported a return of 9.5% (IRR) to investors.29 In a 2016 study issued
by the Wharton Social Impact Initiative affiliated with the University of
Pennsylvania, three co-authors of this Article reported that impact funds
seeking market rate returns performed consistent (or nearly consistent)
24. Additionality increases the quantity or quality of a portfolio company’s social outcomes
beyond what it could have generated absent the investment. Brest & Born, supra note 20. Not all
definitions of impact investment require additionality or the notion of but-for causality. See, e.g.,
GREENE, supra note 9, at 39–40.
25. GIIN, BENCHMARK, supra note 9, at 3. Other impact sectors include renewable energy and
climate change, small business finance, and fair trade.
26. Brest & Born, supra note 20; see also STAGARS, supra note 12, at 30–32 (describing how
impact strategies are focusing on undercapitalized places, sectors, and assets).
27. Brest & Born, supra note 20.
28. GIIN, BENCHMARK, supra note 9, at i, 2 (noting that the funds studied sought to make riskadjusted market-rate returns “with target net internal rate of return (IRR) of 15% or higher, and
mezzanine funds with a target net IRR of 10% or higher”). The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the
discount rate that makes the net present value of an investment equal to zero. The IRR reported in the
study reflect actual returns to the limited partners, which are net of management fees and carried
interest. Id. at 9.
29. Id. at 14; see also GIIN, 2015 SURVEY, supra note 10, at 32 (describing impact investors’
portfolio’s performing mostly in line with expectations).
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with benchmark indices demonstrating financial competitiveness, on a
gross basis, with other equity investments.30
Impact funds’ social, environmental, and financial gains are achieved
through investments—venture investing, private equity, and direct
lending—in mission-aligned portfolio companies. Impact funds typically
invest in small capitalization markets subject to friction and inefficiencies
that deter traditional investors. “[T]he most capital-starved countries,
sectors, and institutions are capital starved for a reason: they are the most
difficult ones in which to make financially profitable investments.”31
Limited investment opportunities in emerging economies, especially with
mission-aligned investments, present challenges such as information
asymmetries,32 small investment scale,33 difficulty in building a deal
pipeline,34 and limited exit opportunities, which may deter traditional
investors.35
Impact fund investors commonly include private foundations,
government entities, other financial institutions, and high net-worth
individuals36 who can satisfy the Regulation D requirements for exempt
private equity and VC offerings.37
II. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP PLAN STRUCTURES AND ATTRIBUTES
Our Article examines the relationship, if any, between impact
investments and employee ownership. Employee ownership, also called
shared capitalism in the sociology literature,38 includes stock ownership
30. JACOB GRAY ET AL., GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MISSION PRESERVATION AND FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE IN IMPACT INVESTING 5–6 (Wharton Social Impact Initiative, 2016),
https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-MissionPreservation-and-Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6XM-ZQZW].
31. BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 5, at 31.
32. Impact fund managers must acquire knowledge about existing investment opportunities in
mission-aligned companies and then help those entrepreneurs develop the skills to successfully
manage a business. Id. at 34, 76.
33. Small investments may affect the ability of funds to provide technical assistance, what some
consider a key component of VC success, to portfolio companies. Id. at 34.
34. Id. at 76 (noting the limited investment opportunities).
35. Brest & Born, supra note 20. “[T]he goal of a private equity investor is to invest in portfolio
companies with high growth potential or undervalued assets, work with management to improve
performance of the business, and exit the investment to realize a significant gain.” Hugh Manahan,
Private Equity Investments in Microfinance in India, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 293,
313 (2015).
36. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 22–23.
37. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 22; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2013) (defining accredited
investors); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2013) (Regulation D Exemption for limited offers and sales of
securities not exceeding $5,000,000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013) (Regulation D Exemption for
limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount of offering).
38. Douglas Kruse et al., Does Shared Capitalism Help the Best Firms Do Even Better? 1
(May 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
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plans, stock options, profit sharing, and stock bonus plans owned outright
or through retirement accounts.39 An estimated 9,000 companies have
various forms of stock ownership, profit sharing, and stock bonus plans
affecting40 36% of U.S. employees (approximately 38 million
Americans).41
Employee ownership schemes42 vary across three main aspects:
rights in the stock, access to the stock, and payment for the stock. The first,
rights in the stock, describes whether the employee owns the stock
outright—a grant—or whether the employee holds the right to purchase
company stock at a future date—an option.43 Access to the stock and the
payment schemes are closely related and describe how the employee
obtains the company stock—as a bonus, as a profit sharing plan, through
a defined contribution plan (401k) as a retirement investment option,
through an employee purchase plan, or as a traditional employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP)—as well as whether the employee, a portion of
the employee’s salary, or the company “pays” for the stock.44 Companies
10.1.1.365.4399&rep=rep1&type=pdf; see also JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., THE CITIZEN’S SHARE:
PUTTING OWNERSHIP BACK INTO DEMOCRACY (2013); MICHAEL QUARREY ET AL., TAKING STOCK:
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AT WORK (1986).
39. ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP,
http://www.esop.org [https://perma.cc/2Z6P-L6BF]; see also JACK VANDERHEI ET AL., 401(K) PLAN
ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 2014, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF # 423,
at 31 (2016), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_423.Apr16.401k-Update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4GZV-WU8H] [hereinafter EBRI REPORT].
40. In 2014, the General Social Survey was repeated through the National Opinion Research
Center. The analysis and questions were designed by Douglas Kruse and Joseph Blasi of Rutgers
University and Richard Freeman of Harvard University for the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) Shared Capitalism Project. The General Social Survey sample size was 885 working adults
who were asked very specific questions about their participation in these plans. Data Show Widespread
Employee Ownership in U.S., NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/
widespread-employee-ownership-us [https://perma.cc/4JR6-PWLB].
41. This estimate excludes government employers, nonprofits, partnerships, etc. See A Statistical
Profile of Employee Ownership, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP (Dec. 2015),
https://www.nceo.org/articles/statistical-profile-employee-ownership [https://perma.cc/HU46BLE5].
42. Louis Kelso and M. Adler introduced the modern employee ownership concepts in the 1950s.
LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958). They argued that
capital, not labor, was the primary source of industrial wealth and that technology, as a form of capital,
was the linchpin to economic productivity. They argued that survival of the capitalist economy
depended upon sharing capital ownership with labor as a means to redistribute wealth and prevent
unsustainable pay gaps. Id. at 28–29, 39–41, 171–72. For a brief and compelling history of Louis
Kelso and the birth of the modern ESOP, see Andrew W. Stumpff, Fifty Years of Utopia: A
Half-Century After Louis Kelso’s the Capitalist Manifesto, A Look Back at the Weird History of the
ESOP, 62 TAX LAW. 419 (2009).
43. Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Phantom Stock, Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs), and
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs), NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/
articles/stock-options-restricted-phantom-sars-espps [https://perma.cc/E4DJ-E9G4].
44. See, e.g., How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP.
OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/esop-employee-stock-ownership-plan [https://perma.cc/
JWU9-2ADA].
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also shape the reach of employee owners’ voting rights as full, restricted,
or subject to statutory minimums.45
Employee ownership is a robust field in the study of law and subject
to its own rich debate regarding purpose,46 appropriate structure,47 and
policy implications.48 For purposes of this Article, we highlight the main
structural components of common employee stock plans through which
employees obtain company stock and become employee owners. The
various structures matter immensely with regard to legal oversight,
administration, accounting, and tax.49 For our Article’s discussion, we
treat all of these plans equally as paths to shared employee ownership.50

45. Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Consequences of
Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 305, 308–14 (2008).
46. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1770 (1990) (describing potential
benefits of worker ownership as “worker ownership promises some conspicuous efficiency advantages
over investor ownership, including improved worker productivity, avoidance of the problems of
opportunism associated with worker lock-in, less strategic behavior in bargaining, better
communication of worker preferences, improved monitoring of management, and the further
satisfactions that may arise from participation in the process of collective decision-making”); see also
Justin Schwartz, Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather Than the
Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 219 (2012) (proposing a theory why employee ownership is not more widespread given the
benefits of such structures).
47. See, e.g., Corey Rosen et al., Every Employee an Owner. Really., HARV. BUS. REV., June
2005, https://hbr.org/2005/06/every-employee-an-owner-really [https://perma.cc/6G9V-3QPH]
(arguing for widespread employee participation in ESOPs and other structural features of ownership
plans such as participation and communication).
48. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (1986) (arguing that ESOPs do not deliver the non-tax benefits claimed by
proponents, and cause inefficient market distortions, particularly on the market for corporate control);
see also Elana Ruth Hollo, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Their
Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future American Policy, 23 RUTGERS L.J.
561, 594 (1992) (reviewing the policy goals and performance of employee ownership programs and
concluding that “[t]he primary beneficiaries of ESOP tax subsidies appear to be the corporations which
use ESOPs as takeover defenses or for other purposes”).
49. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, THE ESOP READER: A PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPS) 1, 4 (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen, eds., 2003) (discussing tax,
accounting, and finance benefits for participating companies).
50. We separate out the question of why grant employees ownerships rights in firms from the
question of how to do it, addressing the former, not the later in this Article. Bifurcating the questions
leaves a significant piece of the puzzle on the sidelines, but is necessary for this Article. First, our
small sample size of impact investment funds and responsive employee ownership contract provisions,
as discussed infra at pages 22–28, prevents us from separately examining the question of why. Second,
the firms in which the employees will receive ownership rights are located in different jurisdictions,
which prevents a meaningful analysis of the how question under the current U.S. legal system,
particularly as it relates to deferred compensation plans.
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A. Employee Stock Option Plans
Stock option plans are contractual agreements between the company
and the employees giving employees the right to buy a set number of
company shares at a fixed price51 within a certain period of time after the
grant (exercise window or vesting period).52 To exercise the right, the
holder of the option must tender the exercise price.53 In other words, stock
options give employees the right to purchase stock, with their own money
in the future and subject to additional conditions, usually continued
employment and a lapse of time.54
Employee stock option plans compensate employees when
employees exercise the option to purchase stock and their fixed price is
less than the current trading price or value of the stock.55 Subject to
Internal Revenue Code Section 83(a), nonqualified stock option plans
defer taxation until the time the holder exercises the option, not at the time
of the grant.56 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires
registration of stock options with publicly traded companies and offers an
exemption under Section 70157 for private companies with a written
benefit plan or contract with the employee.58
1. Nonqualified Employee Stock Option Plans
Nonqualified plans, also called nonstatutory plans, are largely
matters of private agreement and are subject to few formation
requirements.59 Participation in nonqualified plans is often concentrated
51. The strike price of the option can be set below, at, or above the market price, exchange price
of publicly traded stock, or fair market value in private company stock. These three pricing options
are called in, at, or out of the money, respectively. Matthew A. Melon, Are Compensatory Stock
Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 535, 539 (2003).
52. Employee Stock Options Plans, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/
empopt.htm [https://perma.cc/6SUD-EF98]. Companies generally use Form S-8 to register the
securities being offered under the plan. Id. For a discussion of employee ownership structures, see for
example Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule
10B-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 549 (2003).
53. Melon, supra note 51, at 540.
54. “Employee ownership may create some property rights in the individual that are realized
only after the employee has achieved a long tenure or even retirement.” Bagchi, supra note 45, at 308.
55. See Mark S. Rhodes, Transfer of Stock § 4:6, in 12 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 5460.20 (7th ed. Apr. 2016) (discussing how stock options compliment
compensation packages and common contractual terms); see Employee Stock Options Plans, supra
note 52.
56. I.R.C. § 83 (2016); Melon, supra note 51, at 542–43.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2016).
58. Robert B. Robbins, Securities Offerings to Employees, Consultants and Advisors Under Rule
701, CX019 A.L.I. CLE 343, § I (2016).
59. See, e.g., Tax Topics: Topic 427—Stock Options, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/
tc427.html [https://perma.cc/9X4H-EN6N]; see also Joe Wallin, Incentive Stock Options vs.
Nonqualified Stock Options, STARTUP L. BLOG (May 15, 2013), http://www.startuplawblog.com/
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among upper management60 in contrast to the qualified plans, discussed
below. Firms can also extend participation to non-employee directors and
independent contractors, in contrast to qualified plans.
Nonqualified option plans are strongly associated with startup
companies, especially in the tech industry. Stock options are one way a
cash-strapped company in an early development stage can attract and
retain talented employees while deferring their compensation and linking
it to the success of the company.61
2. Qualified Employee Stock Option Plans
Qualified plans retain the key features of stock options—employees
use individual funds to purchase stock in the future subject to certain
conditions—and add formation requirements, participation limits, and
prohibitions against discrimination among different types of employees.62
The nondiscrimination requirements result in broad grants in which a large
percentage of employees participate, rather than concentrating the option
in upper management.
Qualified stock option plans may be classified as an “incentive stock
option”63 and receive certain federal tax benefits.64 The difference between
the stock option exercise price and the fair market value on the exercise
date—the compensation—is not taxed under qualified plans, and taxation
is deferred until the employee disposes of the plan stock.65 Qualifying
requirements include that the option price reflect fair market value with a
ten-year expiration date and subject to a $100,000 annual cap.66 A second
form of qualified plans—“Employee stock purchase plans”67—receive
similar tax benefits by excluding gains. Qualification requirements include

2013/05/15/incentive-stock-options-vs-nonqualified-stock-options/
[https://perma.cc/S987-NSP8]
(comparing the two different types of stock option plans).
60. Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, The Political Economy of Employee Ownership in the
United States: From Economic Democracy to Industrial Democracy?, 16 INT’L REV. SOC. 127, 140
(2006).
61. Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 584 (2013) (discussing the role of stock option contracting and
compensation in entrepreneur/startup firms).
62. IRS, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPS), INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL,
§ 4.72.4 (Aug. 18, 2016) https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-072-004.html [https://perma.cc/
Y7R6-49FK].
63. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2016); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.422-1 (2016).
64. Bodie, supra note 52, at 547, 548.
65. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2016); see also Merlo v. C.I.R., 492 F.3d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 2007)
(describing the tax benefits of qualified plans); Melon, supra note 51, at 546.
66. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2016); see also Bodie, supra note 52, at 547–48 (describing the
qualification requirements for incentive plans under Section 422).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 423 (2014); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.423-2 (2009).
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fair market pricing, expiration dates, and broad grants to all full-time
employees with two years or more tenure at the company.68
B. Stock Grants
1. Nonqualified Stock Programs
Stock grants, unlike options, give the holder the stock immediately
or nearly immediately, and usually as a performance incentive.69 These
plans can be referred to as restricted stock plans because receiving the
stock is contingent upon certain future events such as an employment
anniversary or performance benchmarks.70 When the benchmarks are
achieved, the promised stock vests with the employee.71 The employee
now owns the stock. Restricted stock programs are a part of a
compensation package and can be used, as with all forms of employee
ownership, as a recruitment, retention, and alignment tool.72 Restricted
stock program participation is concentrated in upper management and
senior level employees.73
2. Tax-Qualified Stock Programs—Retirement Plans
Tax-qualified defined contribution plans also distribute company
ownership through stock to employers. The most common form of
employee ownership in the U.S. is the employee stock ownership plan
(ESOP).74
As a regulated defined contribution plan, ESOPs were created under
the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)75 and are subject
to oversight through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),76 the Department
68. 26 U.S.C. § 423 (2014).
69. See, e.g., Sam Shah, A Look at Equity Compensation in 2004, 19 J. COMP. & BENEFITS, no.
4, July–Aug. 2003.
70. Gordon Klepper, Restricted Stock Units: The Practical Alternative in Equity Compensation
for the U.S. Multi-national Employer, 20 J. COMP. & BENEFITS, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 14
(Restricted stock programs are contractual rights for an employee to achieve stock “at a scheduled
future time or times, subject to the employee meeting certain employment-related conditions. The
conditions typically require the employee’s continued employment, and also may include obligations
not to compete with the employer, release confidential information, or engage in other misconduct.”).
71. Id.
72. H. Stephen Grace Jr. & John E. Haupert, Governance Lessons from the Disney Litigation,
BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1–2 (2011).
73. See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive
Compensation, 17 CORN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 406 (2008) (describing Enron’s restricted stock
program available to upper management).
74. How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, supra note 44.
75. Id.
76. “[E]mployee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is an individually designed stock bonus plan,
which is qualified under Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a) . . . designed to invest primarily in
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of Labor,77 and the SEC.78 Companies sponsoring ESOPs79 contribute
stock (or money to buy stock) to the plan in order to benefit the company’s
employees. ESOPs must invest primarily80 in “qualifying employer
securities,” offer pass-through voting to participants, permit
diversification as participants approach retirement, and avoid
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees.81
Employers commonly structure ESOPs as stock bonus plans82 or as
a part of profit-sharing plans.83 ESOPs may comprise the sole retirement
benefit or it may be a part of another plan, such as a 401(k).84 Each
participating employee has an account in the ESOP that holds the vested
stock on behalf of the employee.85 Under ERISA-governed ESOPs,
workers receive stock grants without utilizing individualized cash savings
to purchase the shares, thus overcoming an obstacle to employee

qualifying employer securities . . . .ESOPs are subject to the distribution provisions of IRC Section
401(a)(14), but must also comply with the distribution and payment requirements of IRC Section
409(o).” Employee Stock Ownership Plans Determination Letter Application Review Process, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Employee-Stock-Ownership-Plans-Determination-LetterApplication-Review-Process [https://perma.cc/9WNH-GMFW].
77. The Department of Labor has investigative and enforcement authority under Sections 504
and 506 of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, that authority was delegated to
the Employee Benefit Security Administration subject to Secretary’s Order 01-2003, Delegation of
Authority and Assignment of Responsibilities to the Employee Benefits Security Administration signed
by Secretary Elaine Chao on January 23, 2003. Delegation of Authority and Assignment of
Responsibilities to the Employee Benefits Security Administration, 68 Fed. Reg. 5374 (Feb 3, 2003).
78. Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 52.
79. For a general discussion of ESOP requirements, regulations and components, see Rob
Brown, Brian Hector & Scott Stitt, Overview of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 31 J. COMP. &
BENEFITS no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2015.
80. Employers satisfy the “primarily” requirement if more than 50% of the plan’s assets are
invested in stock. See EBSA Report of the Working Group on Employer Assets in ERISA
Employer-Sponsored Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Nov. 13, 1997), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
publications/acemer.htm? (quoting the testimony of Neil M. Grossman, Vice President: Legal and
Regulatory Affairs, Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans).
81. David M. Cantor & Gina M. Marsala, The Role of Company Stock in a Defined Contribution
Plan, 20 J. COMP. & BENEFITS, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 9.
82. 26 U.S.C. § 401 (2014); DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 24 (2010) (“Stock bonus plans are profit-sharing plans under which
contributions made in employer stock or, if made in cash, are then invested, wholly or partly, in
employer stock.”).
83. Cantor & Marsala, supra note 81.
84. ESOPs must be either a qualified stock bonus plan or a combination of qualified stock bonus
plan and money purchase pension plan. PRATT & REECE, supra note 82, at 24. Profit sharing plans
give participating employers funding flexibility depending upon profit and tax benefits whereas money
purchase pension plans require a minimum annual contribution on behalf of the employer sponsor. Id.
at 21–26.
85. Employee Stock Options Plans, supra note 52.
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ownership: lack of capital to purchase stock.86 “ESOPs are most
commonly used to provide a market for the shares of departing owners of
successful closely held companies, to motivate and reward employees, or
to take advantage of incentives to borrow money for acquiring new assets
in pretax dollars.”87
Additionally, companies may list their stock as one of many
investment options in the defined contribution plan menu. Under this
approach, employees use earmarked retirement savings to purchase
company stock through their defined contribution retirement plan, like a
401(k).88 This is a widespread practice and a common means by which
U.S. employees acquire employer stock. “Thirty-three percent (or 8.1
million) of the 401(k) participants in the 2014 EBRI/ICI 401(k) database
were in plans that offered company stock as an investment option.”89
The following chart depicts the structural differences described
above.

III. THEORIES OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Researchers from different backgrounds have studied companies’
motivations to offer employees ownership incentives. Theories supporting
employee ownership are integrated in policy discussions regarding tax,
employee benefit plans, and worker equality. We summarize the literature
and policy debates in the following discussion, along with empirical
predictions for the three main theories discussed in the existing literature.
86. See Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, The Political Economy of Employee Ownership in
the United States: From Economic Democracy to Industrial Democracy?, 16 INT’L REV. SOC. 127,
128 (2006).
87. How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, supra note 44.
88. Blasi & Kruse, supra note 86, at 138.
89. EBRI REPORT, supra note 39, at 31. Employees allocated approximately 7% of
ERISA-governed defined contribution plans assets to company stock, a number that researchers
documented as declining since its high-water mark of 19% in 1999. Id. at 1.
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We then propose a new set of motivations for the inclusion of employee
ownership policies at the fund level, and suggest empirical predictions for
these theories as well. These predictions form the basis of our results
discussion in Section VI.
A. Existing Theories Centered on Portfolio Company Preferences
1. Aligning the Interests of Company Managers and Employees
Explanations for shared ownership plans have traditionally focused
on what may motivate companies to implement such plans. A popular
justification is that giving employees a stake in the company aligns their
incentives with the firm, resolving frictions such as agency problems90 that
might lead employees91 to be less productive than they could be.92 In
testing this interest-alignment theory, studies overall have found improved
workplace performance for firms with shared capitalism plans,93 but noted
that positive effects are observed most strongly when combined with
policies such as low supervision, employee participation in
decision-making, and competitive pay94—and with per-employee growth
options95 and innovation.96 Others, however, argue that employee
ownership is too expensive relative to incentive gains on their own to
justify this approach.97 A twist on the incentive alignment hypothesis is
90. An agency problem occurs when an agent (e.g., employee) has different incentives than the
principal (e.g., manager) who hired her to do a task. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
91. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Market for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
259, 261 (1999) (discussing agency problems and noting that employees “have fewer incentives to use
company resources [more] efficiently than owners”).
92. “Chobani’s workers adopt the habits of business owners: being highly productive; engaging
in less friction between front-line workers and management; self-policing each other to reduce waste
and errors; and offering up many helpful ideas.” Mary Josephs, What Does Chobani’s Founder Get
for Giving 10% of His Company to Workers?, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2016, 4:33 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/maryjosephs/2016/04/29/what-does-chobanis-founder-get-for-giving10-of-his-company-to-workers/#176165e831de.
93. Kruse, supra note 38, at 4–5 (summarizing more than ten studies on organization
performance under shared capitalism policies and concluding that the correlation is overwhelmingly
positive).
94. Id. at 6.
95. Yael V. Hochberg & Laura Lindsey, Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An
Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options, 23 J. FIN. STUD. 4148, 4182 (2010).
96. Xin Chang et al., Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and Corporate Innovation, 115 J.
FIN. ECON. 168, 180 (2015) (“[T]he positive relation between employee options and innovation is
more pronounced in firms with higher employee treatment index or higher R&D per employee,
confirming our conjecture that the positive effect of employee stock options on innovation productivity
is stronger if employee inputs are more important and valued.”).
97. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees: An
Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 100–01, 107–08 (2005).
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that employee ownership plans increase the incentive of employees to
“swing for the fences” (i.e., take more risk) because of the asymmetry of
the upside gain relative to the downside loss.98
Aligning Interests Prediction. If, consistent with the assumptions of
economic literature, portfolio companies are driving inclusion of
employee ownership provisions in our sample, we would expect to observe
common features or clustering among those portfolio companies. For
example, portfolio companies that propose employee ownership
provisions should exhibit similar characteristics such as heavy reliance on
employees for production or high potential for conflicts of interests
between employees and owners. We may also expect employee ownership
companies to be similar in size, as measured by the number of employees
and the stage of company development.
2. Sorting Employees
Another prevalent theory of employee ownership plans is that they
serve as a sorting mechanism by attracting employees who value a firm’s
option grant most highly.99 This differs from the incentive alignment view
in that it does not assume that employees will act differently, only that
they have a different view of the company from the outset. Especially
within the technology industry, some argue that these plans “help recruit
[talent] in a company’s early days for in-demand workers.”100 Another
way of framing this is that equity or options may be a means of providing
value to employees without having to use cash.101 Indeed, empirical
evidence suggests equity-based compensation plans are particularly
popular with firms facing financial needs and constraints.102
98. See Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, Swinging for the Fences: Executive Reactions to
Quasi-Random Option Grants 1, 30–32 (Nov. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that on
average, “moderate increases in options lead to increased firm equity volatility”).
99. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 97, at 131 (study demonstrating that “if workers are sufficiently
optimistic about their employers’ prospects, stock options can be an efficient means of
compensation”); see also Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, Employee Sentiment and Stock Option
Compensation, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 671 (2007) (finding that “[o]ption compensation for
non-executive employees is most common among firms with excellent prior stock price
performance”).
100. Strom, supra note 4.
101. Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors’ Responsibilities
Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1451, 1486 (1990) (“[I]t is apparent that Congress established leveraged ESOPs in order to address
perceived inequities in the distribution of capital throughout the economy.”).
102. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 61 J.
FIN. ECON. 253, 255 (2001); see also John R.M. Hand, Give Everyone A Prize? Employee Stock
Options in Private Venture-Backed Firms, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 385, 398 (2008); Christopher D.
Ittner et al., The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New
Economy Firms, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 89, 92 (2003).
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Sorting Employees Prediction. Similar to the interest-alignment
prediction, this hypothesis predicts shared characteristics among employee
ownership firms. If portfolio companies utilize employee ownership plans
to sort potential employees and identify those who are optimistic about the
company’s future prospects, these plans will be more prevalent when they
make more of a difference in sorting. For example, ownership in an
early-stage firm is riskier than ownership in a late-stage firm, so it is likely
a more effective sorting tool in early-stage firms. As a result, the
employee-sorting theory predicts that employee ownership firms should
share common features such as size, industry, geographic focus, or
development phase.
3. Retaining Employees
In addition to attracting the right employees, shared ownership plans
may help firms retain employees by making it costly for them to leave in
bad times when shares of the company are worth less.103 This is especially
true where stock prices and labor market conditions are positively
correlated, because it allows employees’ deferred compensation to vary
along with their outside opportunities.104 Indeed, evidence suggests that
employee ownership is associated with greater employment stability.105
Employee Retention Prediction. If portfolio companies pursue
employee ownership plans to retain talented employees, especially in the
face of employee uncertainty or salary competition pressures, those
companies should exhibit commonalities such as high turnover risk. To
the extent that turnover risk is difficult to observe in this or other samples,
portfolio companies facing high turnover risk should have identifiable

103. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 97, at 100, 110 (exploring a relationship between labor market
conditions in a given industry and a positive correlation with firms’ share prices and hypothesizing
that “then options [should] serve to index deferred compensation to employees’ outside
opportunities”); see also id. at 123–25 (developing a model to test the options hypothesis).
104. Serdar Aldatmaz et al., The Option to Quit: Employee Stock Options on Turnover 18–19
(Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1787169;
see also Simi Kedia & Shiva Rajgopal, Neighborhood Matters: The Impact of Location on Broad
Based Stock Option Plans, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 109, 115 (2009) (positing that “local labor markets affect
a firm’s option grants in four ways: (i) tight labor markets; (ii) Oyer’s (2004) wage indexation theory;
(iii) enforceability of non-compete agreements; and (iv) employee sentiment that favors stock
options”) (citing to Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects, 59 J.
FIN. ECON. 1619 (2004)).
105. Research Evidence on Prevalence and Effects of Employee Ownership 2002: Hearing
before the House Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on Education and the
Workforce, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Dr. Douglas Kruse Ph.D.),
https://www.nceo.org/articles/research-prevalence-effects-employee-ownership
[https://perma.cc/
7ZWF-L7ED] (citing to JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., STOCK OPTIONS, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (2000)) [hereinafter Kruse Testimony].
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commonalities such as the industry in which they operate, noncompete
enforceability, age of the workforce, and local unemployment.
4. Other Explanations
Shared ownership may also be a way to address social inequality
within the firm by reducing the gap between management and employees,
both financially and socially.106 However, this may come at the cost of
increased risk for workers.107Additional explanations108 for the popularity
of equity-based compensation include, favorable accounting treatment,109
though employees still need to value the equity highly enough for this to
work;110 peer effects;111 and protection in cases of change of control.112
B. New Theories Centered on Fund Preferences
Employee ownership schemes are widely acknowledged in
industry-based venture capital and private equity materials, including
discussion of valuation, the upsides (for entrepreneurs), the downsides (for
investors), and administration tips.113 Portfolio companies—startups—are
assumed to want employee ownership programs, and investors are
presumed to be resistant. Relevant academic literature documenting
106. Ittner et al., supra note 102, at 92; Strom, supra note 4; see also Hand, supra note 102, at
398.
107. “Employee ownership may have positive effects if employees value ownership in itself or
perceive that it brings greater income, job security, or control over jobs and the workplace. On the
other hand, it may have negligible or even negative effects if employees perceive no difference in their
work lives, dislike the extra risk to their income or wealth, or have raised expectations that are not
fulfilled.” Kruse Testimony, supra note 105.
108. These hypotheses are beyond the scope of our project, but included in this discussion for
purposes of introducing readers to the existing literature.
109. See generally ESOP Tax Incentives and Contribution Limits, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP.
OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/esop-tax-incentives-contribution-limits [https://perma.cc/
AA7C-RKN4]; Core & Guay, supra note 102, at 255 (Employers can deduct contributions to the
ESOP as well as dividends and rollovers; employees pay no tax on ESOP participation until
distributions).
110. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 97, at 112 (discounting the accounting advantages of employee
ownership and arguing that firms incur “real costs of about $3,000 per middle manager per year in
order to increase reported pre-tax income by about $9,000”).
111. Kedia & Rajgopal, supra note 104, at 109, 122 (investigating and demonstrating the social
influence of option granting by showing that “option grants are increasing with the average broad
based option grants of other firms located in the MSA”).
112. Gavis, supra note 101, at 1489 (“ESOPs . . . may play a significant role in providing
employees with protection against risks associated with hostile takeovers.”).
113. See, e.g., ACCION, Startup Employees Stock Options Plans (ESOPs) Overview and Best
Practices, http://docplayer.net/7672111-Startup-employee-stock-options-plans-esops-overview-andbest-practices.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2016) (describing stock options in startup companies); see
also Richard Harroch, How Employee Stock Options Work in Startup Companies, FORBES (Feb. 27,
2016, 10:32 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/02/27/how-employee-stock-optionswork-in-startup-companies/#5a435d2013ce.
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venture capital and private equity terms and trends, however, is silent on
employee ownership provisions from the perspective of investing funds.114
Our Article bridges the gap between industry and academia, and
between the portfolio company and the fund perspectives on employee
ownership schemes. In our sample, we observe a clustering of shared
ownership-friendly provisions at the fund level—rather than by company
size or industry. This leads us to question whether funds themselves are
exerting pressure on portfolio companies to adopt shared ownership plans,
or at least are more permissive of shared ownership requests by portfolio
companies than industry literature would suggest. Below, we propose five
hypotheses broken into two categories: financial motivations and impact
motivations. We offer alternative predictions based upon the assumption
that employee ownership is not a costless proposition.115
If employee ownership provisions are clustered in a fund that invests
in diverse types of companies without observable commonalities among
the portfolio companies, then it is likely that the funds, rather than the
companies, are pursuing employee ownership schemes. Because diverse
portfolio companies are unlikely to face the same employee
challenges—aligning incentives, sorting, and retaining talent—diverse
portfolio companies are likely to generate noisy results within and between
the funds if there is no other explanation for the inclusion of employee
ownership schemes. For example, we would expect to see employee
ownership provisions distributed throughout the funds and fund families
without a discernable pattern. If, however, funds are pursuing the
employee ownership provisions, we would expect to see employee
ownership provisions clustered within funds.
1. Financial Motivations
a) “Rolling Up” Company Preferences
First, it may be that funds view shared ownership plans as a financial
best practice for companies, for any of the reasons listed in the previous
section. Funds, as shareholders in the portfolio companies, may adopt the
preferences traditionally attributed to portfolio companies (aligning
interests, sorting, retention, accounting, etc.) in pursuing employee
114. See Steven Freeman, Effects of ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: Thirty Years of
Research and Experience, 4–5 (U. Pa. Organizational Dynamics Working Paper No. 07–01, 2007),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=od_working_papers [https://
perma.cc/ME39-NLTF].
115. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1771–77, 1779 (1990) (describing
capital and governance costs associated with worker ownership plans as compared to investor
ownership organizations).
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ownership programs. We call this the roll up hypothesis. Funds may act
according to the roll up hypothesis if the portfolio companies lack the
sophistication to negotiate for these provisions on their own behalf. As a
result, they encourage portfolio companies to adopt employee ownership
plans to maximize firm productivity and ultimately their own profit.
Roll Up Prediction. It will be difficult to directly observe funds’
preference for employee ownership schemes consistent with the
roll up hypothesis—the desire to implement interest-aligning and
employee-sorting and retention best practices as a means of protecting the
fund’s investment in the portfolio company. If funds encourage or allow
portfolio company ESOPs because they are acting in their best interests as
shareholders in the portfolio company, then we would expect to observe
other shareholder protective measures such as strong financial and
governance contracting terms that traditionally protect investors’ financial
interests in portfolio companies.
b) Deflating Effective Price Per Share
There has also been recent anecdotal evidence116 of funds using
employee option pools as a way of decreasing the price per share of a
prospective portfolio company. The scheme, sometimes called an “option
shuffle,” works like this: funds agree to a pre-money valuation of a
portfolio company, but (sometimes without the entrepreneur realizing) this
pre-money valuation includes a substantial pool of new options issued out
of the pre-money capitalization and set aside for future option
compensation. This effectively dilutes the entrepreneur (in a Series A) or
other pre-investment owners (in later funding).117
To illustrate the impact of an option pool on pricing, consider an
investment offer of $2 million into a company with an $8 million
pre-money valuation and 6 million shares. Under the $8 million valuation,
each share price is $1.33/share. If the investment contract contains
language that the pre-money valuation includes an unallocated option pool
equal to 20% of the post-financing, fully diluted capitalization, the 20% of
$10 million post-financing capitalization creates $2 million in new options
and reduces the founders’ stake to 6 million shares in a 10 million share
company or 60% of the post-financing valuation. In this regard, the
effective pre-money valuation of the company is $6 million and the price
per share is $1.
Option Shuffle Prediction. If funds prefer employee ownership
schemes as a means to discount the per-share price paid by the fund to
116. See The Option Pool Shuffle, VENTUREHACKS (Apr. 10, 2007), http://venturehacks.com/
articles/option-pool-shuffle [https://perma.cc/2PLU-XSNW].
117. Id.
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enhance the fund’s financial position, then the employee ownership
language in the term sheets and investment agreements should create the
employee stock option pool based upon a pre-money capitalization. We
would similarly expect these funds to seek market rate returns, rather than
concessionary financial returns, and have strong finance contracting terms.
2. Impact Motivations
a) Agency Costs
Traditional funds have a single goal: maximize financial returns.
Impact funds118 balance two goals: financial profits and social or
environmental impact. In pursuit of the latter, impact funds invest in
benefit-oriented companies through which they pursue financial gains.
Investors and portfolio company founders may agree or differ on what the
ideal balance between these goals should be. Investors could try to impose
their preferred balance through traditional contracting terms, but the
absence of contracting norms, the relative infancy of the field, and the
highly individualized needs of each portfolio company may render
traditional contracting solutions impotent. Investors seeking the ideal
balance between good and gold may, as a result, be more likely to rely on
other contracting tools such as employee ownership to indirectly manage
employees’ incentives.
Agency Costs Prediction. If funds prefer employee ownership
schemes as a means of neutralizing expanding agency costs in a
finance/benefit goal binary by encouraging employees to balance the dual
goals, then funds may similarly contract for a balance of terms that protect
both financial and nonpecuniary gains. For example, funds could also
protect their preferred balance of goals by making cash flow contingent on
meeting pre-set financial and impact goals. Alternatively, the parties may
not be capable of directly contracting to impose the fund’s preferred
balance and instead must rely upon indirect measures like shared
ownership.
b) Mission Lock
Impact funds may also encourage the companies in their portfolio to
share ownership with their employees (at least partially) as an alternative
way of locking in mission. Early employees are often most wedded to the
initial vision of the company.119 If the workforce is fairly stable, employee
118. Note that here we are talking about market rate-seeking impact funds.
119. William A. Brown & Carlton F. Yoshioka, Mission Attachment and Satisfaction as Factors
in Employee Retention, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT & LEADERSHIP 5, 13–14 (2003) (citing to respondents’
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ownership plans may ensure that part of the firm’s ownership remains
invested in the firm’s mission, even after a change of control.120 Funds
select target investments based, in part, on company mission, and some
funds gauge their impact by sustained company commitment to mission,
even after fund exit. Impact funds may be especially attuned to missionaligning mechanisms with portfolio companies and prefer employee
ownership as one means to pursue that end.
Mission Lock Prediction. If funds are implementing employee
ownership as a way of aligning mission incentives, those funds may also
have other provisions in place to protect company mission during the
investment and/or after the fund’s exit. For example, fund exits that are
not mission-aligned could be prohibited in the investment contract. For
example, a fund may be prohibited, by a mission lock term in the
agreement, from selling its equity position in the portfolio company to a
non-impact committed investor such as a traditional private equity fund.
c) Direct Impact
Impact funds may also prefer employee ownership schemes if
promoting employee ownership is consistent with the social impact
mission of the fund. For some impact funds, employee ownership itself
may be a goal, especially if the fund has a stated impact goal of, for
example, job creation or economic empowerment. Shared ownership plans
can build financial inclusion and add social impact value by offering
options programs to all levels of employees, though the value of such a
program will depend on employees’ preferences and beliefs.121
Direct Impact Prediction. If funds are implementing employee
ownership provisions to serve the fund’s impact mission, then funds that
state a mission for social/individual economic empowerment (rather than
environmental benefit, for example) should be more likely to implement
employee ownership than other types of funds.

attachment to mission as a prominent explanation of why individuals intended to stay with the
organization).
120. This is similar to the argument in Gavis, supra note 101, at 1489. Consider, for example,
that under the Delaware Benefit Corporation Act, only shareholders can bring derivative suits to
enforce mission. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2013) (authorizing shareholder derivative suits to
enforce directors’ duties to “manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation
in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits
identified in its certificate of incorporation” consistent with § 365(a)).
121. See ACCION, supra note 113 (describing various methods for constructing employee
ownership plans).
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IV. DATA POOL AND METHODOLOGY OF REVIEW
The data described in this Article are generated from survey
responses and documents submitted by impact investment funds as a part
of a study administered by the Wharton Social Impact Initiative (WSII).122
A. Wharton Social Impact Initiative Survey
Our data come from a survey of impact funds administered by the
WSII. WSII compiled an initial database of 437 possible impact PE funds
via primary research and by working with organizations such as B Lab,
the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), and Anthos
Asset Management, and referring to lists such as ImpactBase and Impact
Assets 50. At the time of our document review, eighteen months after the
first release of the survey, 342 fund managers were contacted and 47 had
completed the survey, representing 64 separate funds and 656 portfolio
companies.123
The WSII survey covers a range of questions that can broadly be split
into eight categories:
(i) General fund-level questions, such as fund focus, size, vintage
year, and whether the fund self-identifies as an impact fund;
(ii) Fund-level impact questions, such as the nature of the fund’s
impact mission and the rights and responsibilities of General Partners
(GPs) with respect to the fund’s stated mission, if any. Funds also
have the option to upload ratings from the Global Impact Investing
Rating System (GIIRS) if applicable;
(iii) Fund-level contract questions, such as hurdle rate and initial fund
term. Funds also have the option to upload Private Placement
Memoranda (PPM), Limited Partner Agreements (LPA), and side
letters;
(iv) Fund-level quarterly financial data, such as cash flows. Funds
also have the option to upload audited financial documents;
(v) General portfolio company-level questions, such as industry,
location, and size. Funds also have the option to upload term sheets;

122. Authors of this paper, Dr. Chris Geczy (Principal Investigator), Dr. David Musto (Principal
Investigator), and Jessica Jeffers (Ph.D. Candidate) worked in conjunction with others at the Wharton
Social Impact Initiative to design the survey study, solicit participants, and receive and track results.
See Jacob Gray, et al., Great Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact
Investing (Oct. 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2694620.
123. Because of the sensitive nature of the information, the WSII survey data is protected by a
strict confidentiality agreement, and we cannot identify any of the funds discussed below.
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(vi) Portfolio company-level impact questions, such as company
impact focus;
(vii) Portfolio company-level financial questions, such as capital
invested and pre-money valuation; and finally
(viii) Realization-level questions, such as realization type and
whether the realization was mission-aligned. A sample of the survey
questions reported upon in this paper is available at Appendix A
to this Article.

B. Document Review
Twenty-three fund management companies, representing thirty-six
impact investment funds, submitted documents and formed our sample.
We reviewed 164 contractual documents reflecting organization of the
funds and fund investment in portfolio companies. For our data discussion,
fund-level documents mean legal documents regarding the formation of
and investment into the fund. These documents are created for investors
into the impact fund and include documents such as limited partnership
agreements, operating agreements, investment agreements, and private
placement memoranda. Portfolio company-level documents, on the other
hand, refer to investment agreements and terms between the impact fund
and the portfolio company in which the fund will invest. Portfolio
company-level documents include preliminary term sheets, investment
agreements, and subscription agreements.
Document review responses were verified or supplemented by
survey responses when the contents of the document review and survey
overlapped or were complementary.
Figure 1: Documents Reviewed

2017]

In Pursuit of Good & Gold

581

We frame our results discussion around four samples originating
from survey participation. The first and largest sample captures all survey
responses. Depending upon the survey question, we typically describe this
sample as “all survey funds” or “all survey portfolio companies.”124 The
second cut captures all fund-submitted documents by funds participating
in the survey. This group is smaller than the all-survey responses simply
because not all participating funds submitted legal documents in
conjunction with the survey. Depending on the analysis, we often segment
this sample into “all document review funds” or “all document review
portfolio companies.” Our third grouping captures funds that include
employee ownership provisions in some documents. Throughout the
remainder of the Article, we refer to these funds as employee
ownership-friendly or favorable funds (EO Funds) and focus our analysis
on EO Funds or on all of the portfolio company documents of EO Funds.
This third grouping is necessary because within the documents submitted
by EO Funds, some, but not, all portfolio company documentation
contains employee ownership provisions. For example, a fund may have
submitted documents for fifteen portfolio companies, only seven of which
include employee ownership provisions. We count this fund as an EO
Fund, and include all portfolio companies of this EO Fund in the third
sample. Finally, we created the fourth and smallest sample of the portfolio
companies with employee ownership provisions in their investment
documents, often referred to below as EO Fund responsive portfolio
companies or EO portfolio companies. Returning to the example above,
only the seven portfolio companies with employee ownership provisions
are included as an EO Fund responsive portfolio company.
1. The Employee Ownership Sample
Twenty-three funds and fund families submitted documents for our
review: twelve were stand-alone funds. Nine fund families have common
managers and created two or more legally separate and distinct funds.
Counting all participants—standalone and sub funds—thirty-six funds
participated in the document review.
Funds provided investment documents detailing their investment in
portfolio companies. Our total document sample contained 100
portfolio-level documents: 80 term sheets and 20 investment contracts
124. We further analyzed survey responses by applying our next three data cuts (all document
review, all EO funds/portfolio companies, and all EO Fund responsive portfolio companies, to the
survey responses at both the funds and portfolio company levels. Our document review produced
thirty-one EO Fund responsive portfolio companies. We were able to identify thirty EO portfolio
companies in the survey responses by matching the funds, managers, and portfolio company identified
in the survey responses; for one, we were not able to verify it sufficiently to include in the survey
responses for EO portfolio companies.
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such as subscription agreements, shareholder agreements, and loan
agreements. We reviewed documents dated from 1996 to 2014, with the
majority occurring between 2009 and 2014.
Out of our sample, thirty-one documents (31% of portfolio
investment documents) contained references to employee ownership
schemes and form the basis of one of our key samples discussed in this
Article. Figure 2 presents employee ownership-favorable documents
spanning from 2003 to 2014, with three documents undated.
Figure 2: Employee Ownership Document Timeline

Eight of the thirty-six, or 22%,125 impact investment funds
participating in the document review included employee ownership
provisions in their portfolio investment documents. Participating funds
submitted between one and twenty-five documents at the fund and
portfolio level for review, with an average of 4.6 documents per fund,126
and more than half of participating funds submitted three or fewer
documents.

125. If we look at the fund family level, six funds out of twenty-three contained employee
ownership language representing 26% of the sample.
126. If we look at the fund family level, the average documents submitted per fund family is 7.3,
but that number is skewed by the three fund families that submitted more than twenty documents.
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Table 1: EO Fund Documents
Participating
Fund
Fund 1
Fund 2
Fund 3127
Fund 4
Fund 5
Fund 6
Fund 7
Fund 8

Total Documents
Submitted
20
6
10
10
5
Parent Total: 25

Responsive
Documents
12
2
1
8
1
Parent Total: 10

4
13
12

1
1
5

Six of the employee ownership-favorable funds are limited
partnerships—two organized in the U.S., one in Canada, and three in the
Cayman Islands—plus one private trust organized in India and one
investment company organized in Luxembourg. Non-U.S. funds
(twenty-two) dominated our all document review sample (thirty-six) so
U.S. funds may be over-represented in our EO-friendly sample.128 The
responding funds were largely organized as limited partnerships or the
equivalent in the country of organization. The target size of the employee
ownership-favorable funds ranged from $10 million to more than $200
million, which was consistent with the distribution of fund sizes in the
overall sample.129
The EO Funds focused investment in targeted regions including
India, Mexico, Asia, Latin America, and two distinct regions in the United
States. Out of the all document review sample of funds, excluding the five
funds with an unknown geographic focus, ten were focused in the U.S. and
twenty-one outside of the U.S.: Africa (6), Asia (3), India (1), Mexico (1),
and a combination130 of regions (10).
Impact funds also define their investment strategy by the industry,
product, benefit, or development stage of companies in which they seek to
invest. EO Funds targeted investment in such wide-ranging foci as “small
firms in technology, handicrafts, renewable energy and agribusiness,”
127. Funds 3, 4, and 5 share a common fund manager and target similar investments under
similar criteria.
128. When collapsing the information to the fund family level, eighteen out of twenty-three fund
families are organized outside of the United States. The state of incorporation is unknown for three
funds in the document review sample.
129. Note that the document review sample contained one fund size outlier with a target fund
size of $500 million.
130. Combination regions included Latin America and Africa (1); Latin America, Africa & Asia
(1); India, Asia & Latin America (3); World Bank countries (1); and OCED countries (3).
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“essential products,” “low-carbon sector services and products,” “middle
market” technology, finance and communications firms, and more
generally “economic development” opportunities in targeted
communities.
Impact funds seek different rates of financial returns: risk-adjusted,
market-based returns (highest) or concessionary returns seeking either
below market (middle) or capital preservation returns (lowest). Analyzing
survey responses provided by EO Funds, we observed that seven out of
eight EO Funds reported “targeting competitive, market rate returns,” a
rate of 87.5% compared to 66% and 60% of responding funds in the
document review and all survey response samples, respectively. Our fund
sample seeks risk-adjusted market rate returns consistent with the results
published in a 2016 GIIN impact investing study, with 59% market
rate-seeking funds.131
Table 2: Survey Response on Targeted Financial Returns

Total Responses
Targeting
Competitive, Market
Rate Returns
Targeting Below
Market, but Close to
Market Returns
Targeting Below
Market, Close to
Capital Preservation
Returns
Not Applicable
(Explain)132

EO Funds

All Doc. Rev.
Funds

8
7
(87.5%)

27
18
(66%)

All Survey
Responding
Funds
55
33
(60%)

0

5
(18.5%)

10
(18.18%)

1
(12%)

4
(14.81%)

10
(18.18%)

0

0

2
(3.63%)

V. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (EO) RESULTS
A. Portfolio Company Characteristics
We coded and statistically analyzed fund-provided survey responses
regarding portfolio company characteristics to gain insight on whether
131. GIIN, 2016 SURVEY, supra note 10, at 40.
132. Participants who selected “Not Applicable” were able to provide a textual description of
why.
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portfolio companies drive employee ownership provisions. We analyzed
portfolio company data regarding the number of employees and
development status.
On the first measure, development stage, all EO Fund portfolio
companies and EO Fund responsive portfolio companies had a higher
stage of self-reported development than that of all document review and
all survey portfolio companies. None of the EO Fund portfolio companies
and none of the EO Fund responsive portfolio companies reported being
in the product development or beta stage. Later stage development is
consistent with emerging norms in impact investment.133
Table 3: Portfolio Company Development Stage
All Survey
Portfolio
Co.

Product
Development
Beta
Deploying
Product or
Service
Profitable
N/A

All EOFunds’
Portfolio
Co.
(58)
0

All EO
Portfolio
Co.

(278)
14

All Doc.
Rev.
Portfolio
Co.
(157)
7

5.03%
1
< 1%
94

4.45%
1
< 1%
67

0%
0
0%
21

0%
0
0%
11

33.81%
151
54.67%
18
6.47%

42.67%
78
49.68%
4
2.54%

36.20%
37
63.79%
0
0%

36.66%
19
63.33%
0
0%

(30)134
0

We analyzed survey responses regarding the portfolio companies’
targeted industry. Within the survey sample, fund managers reported on
the industry focus of 282 portfolio companies in ninety-five different
industries. The distribution was broad: seventy-seven identified industries
had two or fewer responses. Survey respondents identified nine industries
with five or more participating portfolio companies, which are listed in
Table 4 below. Other cross-sectional analysis with less than five
133. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 23.
134. As discussed above, one portfolio company identified in the document review could not be
linked back to the survey data and, thus, is excluded from the discussion of portfolio company survey
data.
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participating portfolio companies are marked in the table with a bracket.
Fund managers reported on 161 portfolio companies included in the
document review representing fifty-four industries, most of which had
fewer than five participating companies. For all EO Fund portfolio
companies, distribution was spread thinly across twenty-seven industries,
with only two—healthcare and microfinance—representing five or more
portfolio companies. Our sample of EO Fund responsive portfolio
companies (thirty) covered eighteen industries,135 with highest
participation in education, health care, housing, livelihood,136 and
technology industries.
Table 4: Survey Responses—Portfolio Company Industries

Total Industries
Agriculture
Agribusiness
Consumer
Education
Financial
Healthcare
Housing137
Livelihood
Manufacturing
Microfinance
Mobile phone
Software
Technology

All
Portfolio
Co. Survey
Responses
(282)
95
34
9
6
5
37
14
10
[3]
8
21
10
6
9

All
Document
Review
Portfolio
Co. (161)
54
27
[1]
5
5
7
10
7
[3]
8
21
Ø
[4]
9

EO Fund
All
Portfolio
Co.
(57)
27
[4]
Ø
Ø
[3]
[1]
8
[3]
[3]
[2]
8
Ø
Ø
[3]

EO Fund
Responsive
Portfolio
Co.
(30)
18
[2]
Ø
Ø
[2]
[1]
[3]
[3]
[3]
Ø
[2]
Ø
Ø
[3]

Portfolio companies employed workforces sized from zero to more
than 10,000 employees. Seventy-five percent and 79% of all survey
responses and all portfolio companies in our document review
135. Represented industries include: agriculture (2), clean water (1), education (2), energy (1),
financial (1), government (1), health care (3), housing (3), internet (2), livelihood (3), micro/small
loans (1), rural ban (1), specialty (1), technology (3), textile (1), and wireless (1).
136. One fund describes livelihood as one’s “means of support or subsistence” or the activities
that economically support a person and his/her family.
137. The category “Housing” reflects two subcategories of housing in the survey, which are
rolled up into a single industry for purposes of this table and our discussion.
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respectively, employed between 1–249 employees. Employing between
1–248 employees decreased to 67% for all EO Funds’ portfolio companies
and all EO Fund responsive portfolio companies. The variance is due to
one additional EO Fund responsive portfolio company reporting in the
250–499 range (and therefore also included in the all EO Fund portfolio
company grouping), a change that seems unremarkable given the small
sample size responding to each employment category. For further
descriptive results, see
Table 5 below.
Table 5: Survey Responses—Portfolio Company Workforce Size
All Survey
Portfolio
Co.
(245)
# of
Employees
0
1–19
20–99
100–249
249–499
500–999
1000–2499
2500–4999
5000–9999
10,000–
24,999

16
6.53%
56
22.85%
80
32.65%
48
19.59%
15
6.12%
12
4.89%
6
2.43%
3
1.22%
3
1.22%
3
1.22%

All Doc. Review Portfolio Co.
(146)

EO Funds’
All Portfolio
Co.
(58)

8
5.47%
30
20.54%
54
36.98%
32
21.91%
7
4.48%
6
4.10%
4
2.73%
2
1.36%
1
< 1%
2
1.36%

0
0%
8
13.79%
18
31.03%
16
27.58%
6
10.34%
6
10.34%
3
5.17%
1
1.72%
1
1.72%
2
3.44%

All EO
Responsive
Portfolio
Co. (30)

0
0%
2
6.66%
13
43.33%
5
16.66%
5
16.66%
2
6.66%
2
6.66%
0
0%
1
3.33%
0
0%
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B. EO Funds and Contracting
1. Funds’ Contracting for Financial and Governance Rights
Within our document sample, we reviewed common venture
capital/private equity financial and governance terms,138 including the
employee ownership terms that guide this study.
a) Common Financing and Governance Terms in Venture
Capital/Private Equity Contracts
Table 7 highlights common venture capital/private equity terms
included in portfolio company-level documents utilizing three of our four
samples:139all document review portfolio companies, EO Funds all
portfolio companies, and EO Fund responsive portfolio companies.
These contract terms document financial interests and rights intended
to protect investors’ financial stakes in the portfolio company, measures
we later link to funds’ financial incentives to include employee ownership
provisions. Consistent across all data samples there is a preference for
equity investments over debt and a high occurrence of investor-protective
exit measures such as put options, redemption rights, and tag along
rights—all of which occurred more frequently in the EO Fund sample
compared to the broader sample. Additional protective measures of
investors’ equity stakes include rights of first refusals on third-party stock
sales, and preemptive and anti-dilution rights—again with noticeable
increases for EO Funds as shown in all of their portfolio company
documents and, in particular, the EO Fund responsive documents.
EO Fund documents granted higher investor governance rights
including guaranteed seats on the portfolio company board of directors,
step in rights, and veto/approval rights. EO Funds were also more likely
than the rest of the sample to have documented registration rights in the
event of an IPO, noncompetes with the company entrepreneurs, and
enhanced information rights (both quarterly performance and audited
annual statements).
Impact funds were more likely than the rest of the sample to
document preferred return140 rights —38.70% occurrence within the EO
Fund responsive documents compared to 21% in the overall sample.
138. See, e.g., Kaplan & Stomberg, 2003, supra note 8; Kaplan & Stomberg, 2004, supra note
8; Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and
Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791 (2005).
139. This section relies solely on data collected from the document review and therefore excludes
the all-survey portfolio company sample.
140. Preferred returns are the minimum amount of profits shared with holders of preferred
financial rights before profits are distributed to other investors.
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Within the sample as a whole, funds infrequently used waterfall
compensation arrangements141 as demonstrated by low-to-no occurrences
of carried interest, catch up periods, or management fees paid by the
portfolio company to the investor or its affiliates. The occurrence of hurdle
rates142 is slightly greater for the sample generally (12%) than for EO Fund
responsive documents (9.67%). The EO Fund responsive sample was also
slightly more likely to include a commitment fee paid by the portfolio
company to the investor—54.83% within the EO Fund responsive sample
compared to 50% in all documents reviewed and 42.35% in all EO Fund
portfolio company documents.

141. A common profit allocation model in private equity funds is the distribution waterfall where
profits are distributed first to limited partners in the amount of their original investment and second to
limited partners to pay a preferred return (the hurdle rate). Thereafter the profits are usually split 80/20
between limited partners and the general partner, with the 20% share to the general partner referred to
as the carried interest or carry. TOMAS KRÜGER ANDERSEN, PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS,
CONTRACTS AND REGULATION 71 (2015). Some agreements also include a catch up period where
before profits are split 80/20, the general partner will be distributed profits up to a specified percentage.
142. Hurdle rates are linked to preferred returns and are a part of a waterfall financial
arrangement common to private equity, particularly to limited partnerships. The preferred returns are
called hurdle rates because the initial return on investment must be paid to investors because the
general partner or fund founder gets paid the carried interest that is a part of the waterfall compensation
arrangements. All hurdle rates are preferred returns, but not all preferred returns are hurdle rates if
they simply reflect priority financial interests outside of additional payment schemes like carried
interest. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 141, at 71. A recent study found in a sample of traditional
venture capital funds that venture funds draw approximately 17.75% of committed investments as fees
rather than the typically referenced 20%, and that 40% of venture funds have hurdle rates with a
median of 8%. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2303, 2310–12 (2010).
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Table 6: Investor Financial & Governance Contract Terms

Total Documents
Equity Issued in
Portfolio Co.
Debt Issued in
Portfolio Co.
Call Option
Put Options &
Redemption Rights
Rights of First
Refusal on 3rd P. Stock
Sales
Tag Along Rights
Preemptive &
Anti-dilution Rights
Investor Guaranteed
BOD Seat
Investor Step in Rights
Investor Approval or
Veto Rights
Commitment Fee Paid
to Investor
Catch up Periods
Hurdle Rate
Carried Interest
Preferred Return
Registration Rights
Management Fee Paid
to Investor/Affiliate

All Doc. Rev.
Portfolio Co.

EO Funds All
Portfolio Co.
doc.

EO Funds
Responsive
Portfolio Co.
doc.

100
77
77.00%
21
21.00%
12
12.00%
44
44.00%
38
38.00%

59
50
84.75%
3
5.08%
4
6.78%
29
49.15%
25
42.37%

31
29
93.54%
1
3.22%
3
9.67%
18
58.06%
18
58.06%

51
51.00%
66
66.00%
79
79.00%
20
20.00%
79
79.00%
50
50.00%
0
0.00%
12
12.00%
1
1.00%
21
21.00%
33
33.00%
4
4.00%

31
52.54%
44
74.58%
50
84.75%
13
22.03%
47
79.66%
25
42.37%
0
0.00%
5
8.47%
1
1.69%
14
23.73%
20
33.90%
4
6.78%

23
74.19%
28
90.32%
30
96.77%
8
25.80%
29
93.54%
17
54.83%
0
0.00%
3
9.67%
0
0.00%
12
38.70%
12
38.70%
0
0.00%
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Total Documents
Noncompete with Co.
Entrepreneurs
Confidential
Agreement
Information Rights:
Quarterly Statements
Information Rights:
Annual Audited
Financials

591

All Doc. Rev.
Portfolio Co.

EO Funds All
Portfolio Co.
doc.

EO Funds
Responsive
Portfolio Co.
doc.

100
40
40.00%
61
61.00%
64
64.00%

59
25
42.37%
36
61.02%
42
71.19%

31
18
58.06%
21
67.74%
28
90.32%

64
64.00%

41
69.49%

28
90.32%

b) Employee Ownership (EO) Provisions
Of the thirty-one EO Fund responsive legal documents, twenty-four
created new employee ownership programs, four enhanced existing
programs, and three acknowledged existing programs without modifying
them.
Figure 3: EO Terms in Documents

Documents Discussing ESOPs
Sum of ESOP in Term Sheet

Sum of Create new ESOP

Sum of Mention existing ESOP

Sum of Enhance ESOP

31
24

6

EO Terms

4
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All employee ownership provisions within our sample utilize an
employee option pool; none contain stock grants or ownership programs
as a part of a retirement benefit plan.
Employee ownership language in the reviewed contracts varied
significantly. The option pool grants ranged from 5% or less (6), to
6%–10% (13), 11%–15% (7) on a post-money basis, or left the amount
unstated and to be agreed upon with final documentation (5). Some
contracts expressly stated the purpose of the plan as: “providing long-term
incentives to current and future employees”143 or “to attract and incentivize
current and future employees.”144 Three funds in eight documents
indicated—either in language145 or the capitalization table—that the
reserved option pool would be created out of the pre-money capitalization
thus indicating founder share price dilution consistent with the option
shuffle discussed above.146 Ten documents clearly established that the
option pool would be created post-money investment, and thirteen were
too unclear to be categorized for this Article. Of the three funds that
documented founder dilution through the employee ownership plans, one
was the sole EO Fund reporting below-market returns, while others
reported seeking market returns consistent with the rest of the EO Funds.
2. Contracting for Funds’ General Impact
Impact investments target nonpecuniary returns, most commonly
measured in environmental or social terms, in addition to financial gains.
In our document review, we observed how investors and portfolio
companies documented the commitment to and protections for these other
gains. Overall, we observed significantly fewer contract terms regarding
the other gains. Given the opacity of the nonpecuniary gains in the
portfolio company-level contracts, we expanded our review to include
fund-level documents such as limited partnership agreements and
private placement memoranda that may better detail how the funds’ plan
to generate the nonpecuniary gains.

143. Document on file with the authors.
144. Document on file with the authors.
145. “The Company will create an unallocated option pool representing 10% of the post investment fully diluted share capital of the Company for issuance to the Promoters, employees, officers and
consultants of the Company. However, such an unallocated option pool shall be created prior to the
investment by the Investors.” Document on file with the authors (emphasis added).
146. See The Option Pool Shuffle, supra note 116.
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Table 7: Benefit Contract Terms
All Doc.
Rev.
(Port.
Co. &
Fund
levels)

All Doc.
Rev.
Port. Co.
Doc.

164

100

29
17.69%

10
10.00%

7
4.26%

Measure of
Fund Social
Impact
Impact
Committee
External
Monitoring of
Impact

Total
Documents
Available
Social
Metrics
Addressed in
Document
Environmental
Commitment

All EO
Fund
Doc.
(Port.
Co. &
Fund
levels)
80

EO Fund
All
Portfolio
Co. Doc.

EO Fund
Responsive Port.
Co. Doc.

59

31

8
10.00%

4
6.70%

1
3.22%

0
0.00%

1
1.25%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

7
4.26%

1
1.00%

2
2.50%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

6
4.26%

1
1.00%

1
1.25%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

10
6.09%

2
2.00%

2
2.50%

0
0.00%

0
0.00%

To further our understanding of fund commitment to
nonpecuniary/impact gains, we reviewed survey responses for funds
included in the document review sample. Two EO Funds reported having
a GIIRS147 rating for the fund: a response rate of 25% that closely mirrors
that of all funds included in our document review (22%). Funds reported
on their general approach to creating social and environmental impact
through their investments: (i) impact through improving the operations of
the companies in which the fund invests, (ii) impact through investment in
business models that specifically create social or environmental benefits,
or (iii) other. Within the EO Funds, one reported focusing on improving
portfolio company operations (compared to five in the overall sample),
147. A third-party impact measurement for impact investing generated by B Analytics. For more
information, see GIIRS Ratings, B ANALYTICS, http://b-analytics.net/giirs-ratings [https://perma.cc/
X59G-TY6N].
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and four reported focusing on business models (compared to twelve in the
overall sample). Five funds, including two EO Funds indicated a different
approach.148
To further explore fund commitment to nonpecuniary/impact gains,
we examined survey responses regarding fund-level documents that
required, granted discretion, or were silent as to manager’s responsibility
to consider nonpecuniary gains when making investment decisions. Six
EO Funds disclosed that their fund-level documents (i.e., limited
partnership agreements and PPMs) required the manager to consider
social and/or environmental factors when making investment decisions; a
75% response rate that exceeds the 58% of all funds included in our
document review. One EO Fund149 and one additional fund from the
general sample reported that the fund-level documents were silent on a
manager’s consideration of social and/or environmental factors when
making investment decisions.
To explore fund commitment to mission lock, we analyzed survey
responses regarding mission-lock at exit,150 rights of funds to exit if a
portfolio company’s mission changes,151 and fund investment in portfolio
companies legally structured to lock in mission.152 EO Funds’ survey
responses indicate portfolio company exit consistent with exit rights in the
other cross sections. Within the EO Funds, we observe low occurrence of
mission-lock contracts, with the exception of one EO Fund reporting
heavy reliance on mission-lock contract terms at exit. EO Funds were less
likely than the all-survey and all-document review sample of funds to
include investment contract terms facilitating early divestment if the
portfolio company changed mission during the investment. EO Funds
reported a higher occurrence of investment in portfolio companies where
mission-lock was built into the legal structure of the portfolio company.
Four EO Funds (57%) reported that 50% or more of its portfolio
148. Other funds described their general approach as investing in companies that produce
products and services for low-income people, purchasing farmland for sustainable farming practice
leases, creating value for others through company investment, promoting sustainable and
stakeholder-oriented companies, and job creation.
149. One EO Fund reported that fund-level documents both allowed managers to consider
environmental factors when making investment decisions and that the fund-level documents were
silent as to the issue. As a result, that fund’s responses are not included in the discussion above.
150. Funds responded to the question: “For what % of your divestments/exits has there been a
contract with the acquirer regarding the ongoing social and environmental performance of the
company? Choose N/A only if your fund has not had any exits.”
151. Funds responded to the question: “What % of the fund’s invested capital has included
language or a covenant in the investment agreement that allows the fund to divest early if the mission
of the investment or business model changes during the investment lifetime?”
152. Funds responded to the question: “What % of the total fund is invested in companies that
have a written legal governance structure that locks in the mission, requiring consideration of its
stakeholders (community, environment, suppliers, employees)?”
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companies had legal structure mission-lock compared to 39% of all survey
funds and 47% of all document review funds.
Table 8: Survey Responses—Mission Lock
For what % of your divestments/exits has there been a contract with
the acquirer regarding the ongoing social and environmental
performance of the company? Choose N/A only if your fund has not
had any exits
All Doc. Rev.
Funds (19)
12
63%
4
21%
1
5%
0

EO-Funds
(7)
4
57%
2
28%
0

25–49%

All Survey
Funds (33)
19
57%
8
25%
2
6%
0

50–74%

0

0

0

N/A
0
1–24%

0

75+

4
2
1
14%
12%
10.50%
What % of the fund’s invested capital has included language or a
covenant in the investment agreement that allows the fund to divest
early if the mission of the investment or business model changes
during the investment lifetime?

0/blank
1–24%
25–49%
50–74%
75+

All Survey
Funds
(33)
18
51%
1
3%
0
0%
1
3%
14
40%

All Doc. Rev.
Funds
(19)
9
47%
1
5%
0
0%
1
5%
8
42%

EO-Funds
(7)
4
57%
1
14%
0
0%
0
0%
2
28%
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What % of the total fund is invested in companies that have a written
legal governance structure that locks in the mission, requiring
consideration of its stakeholders (community, environment, suppliers,
employees)?

0/blank
1–24%
25–49%
50–74%
75+

All Survey
Funds (33)
17
45%
2
6%
4
11%
4
11%
11
31%

All Doc. Rev.
Funds (19)
10
53%
0
0%
2
11%
2
11%
7
37%

EO-Funds
(7)
3
43%
0
0%
0
0%
1
14%
3
42%

C. Portfolio Companies and Funds’ Employee-specific
Contracting Terms
We analyzed contract provisions relating to employees in our
document review. In our initial review of the 164 documents, six
documents originating from five separate funds (13.8% of our sample of
funds) specifically addressed employee wages, safety, or
nondiscrimination as an intended outcome of the investment fund. All
employee-specific statements were included in fund-level documents such
as limited partnership agreements, shareholder agreements, or private
placement memoranda. Only one document corresponded to an EO Fund.
Two EO funds self-reported that they specifically target or have a
preference for investments that impact employees;153 a 25% response rate
that mirrors that of all funds included in our document review (27.78%).
The survey responses do not demonstrate notable trends inside or
outside of the EO Funds and EO Fund portfolio companies. EO Funds
reported low occurrences of employee-specific goals in portfolio
companies and responsive portfolio companies where the numbers
matched or were lower than the survey sample as a whole. Portfolio
company commitment to employees and employment issues consolidated
to the fund level adds nuance to the story. Twenty-five percent of EO
153. Funds answered whether the fund explicitly targets or has a preference for investment in
companies with social impact in employment generation (emphasis added).
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Funds reported portfolio company commitment to income impact,
compared with 11% in our document-review sample and 20% for the
survey responses generally. Thirty-seven percent of EO Funds reported
portfolio company commitment to job creation compared with 19% in our
document-review sample, and 27% for the survey responses generally.
Table 9: Survey Responses—Portfolio Company Employee,
Income and Job Goals

Total
Responses
Portfolio
Co.
Employee
Impact

Portfolio
Co. Income
Impact
Portfolio
Co. Job
Creation
Impact

EO Fund
Responsive
Portfolio Co.

EO Fund All
Portfolio Co.
Doc.

All Survey
Portfolio Co.

58155
8 funds
reporting
0
0.00%

All Doc.
Review
Portfolio Co.
Doc.
209
36 funds
reporting
19
9.09%

30154
8 funds
reporting
0
0.00%
(0 funds
reporting)
5
16.66%

(0 funds
reporting)
7
12.06%

(1 fund
reporting)
33
15.78%

(6 funds
reporting)
49
14.45%

(2 funds
reporting)
4
13.33%

(2 funds
reporting)
9
15.51%

(4 funds
reporting)
53
25.35%

(9 funds
reporting)
97
28.61%

(2 funds
reporting)

(3 funds
reporting)

(7 funds
reporting)

(12 funds
reporting)

339
44 funds
reporting
65
19.17%

VI. HYPOTHESES, PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS DISCUSSION
We organized our inquiry into employee ownership as expressing
portfolio company or fund preferences; we discuss the results reported
above consistent with that organization.

154. One EO-friendly portfolio company was not identified in the survey responses.
155. One EO-friendly portfolio company was not identified in the survey responses.
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A. Are Portfolio Company Preferences Driving EO Provisions?
We did not observe common features among our portfolio
companies—shared industrial foci, heavy reliance on employees for
production, or a workforce size conducive to influencing company
outcomes—which we would expect if portfolio companies drove inclusion
of employee ownership provisions in our sample to align interests with,
sort, or retain employees. Portfolio company characteristics within our
small sample (thirty-one companies), however, do not explain the
preference for employee ownership provisions.
Portfolio Company Industry & Location. Portfolio company
characteristics that would be expected to influence contracting norms
include the industry and geography in which the company operates. In
particular, industry reliance on human capital should influence the use of
shared ownership plans for incentive-aligning purposes156 and local labor
market conditions for their appropriateness for retention purposes.157
Within our sample, however, we observed that the portfolio companies
participated in diverse industries and in diverse locations. Thirty funds158
participated in eighteen different industries, with two or more participating
in the education, health care, housing, livelihood,159 and technology
industries. The thin distribution across many industries was consistent
with our sample as a whole. However, EO Fund portfolio companies, as
compared to survey responses for all portfolio companies, underrepresent
investments in the agriculture business and general financial services but
overrepresent participation in technology, livelihood, and education
industries. It is possible that the employee demands of these industries
drive preferences for employee ownership provisions in a way not
captured by the survey or document review.
Portfolio Company Development Stage. In our results, we noted
some difference between the development stage of EO Fund responsive
portfolio companies (slightly more likely to report that they were
deploying product/services or profitable) and the development stages of
all companies in the document review or survey samples. None of the EO
Fund portfolio companies reported that the company was in a product
development or beta stage. We find these observations insufficient to form
a compelling motivation for employee ownership preferences. We note
that the document review and survey samples had low response rates
156. Chang, supra note 96, at 180.
157. Kedia & Rajgopal, supra note 104, at 115–16.
158. Represented industries included: agriculture (2), clean water (1), education (2), energy (1),
financial (1), government (1), health care (3), housing (3), internet (2), livelihood (3), micro/small
loans (1), rural ban (1), specialty (1), technology (3), textile (1), and wireless (1).
159. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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(under 5%) for early development stages, and a focus on later development
stages is consistent with emerging impact investment norms.160
Additionally, product development and beta stages conjure images of new
product development and enterprise that may not be consistent with the
industry-focus or business models of the relevant portfolio companies if
they are leveraging existing products or skilled labor to a new market.
Workforce. Our study noted some differences in portfolio company
workforce sizes, but these differences offer weak explanations for
company-level preferences for employee ownership. EO Funds reported
that 67% of their portfolio companies employed between 1–249 workers
as compared to 75% of all survey respondents. The EO Fund portfolio
company sample contained several larger employers with five companies
employing between 249–499 employees, two employing 500–999, two
employing 1000–2499, and one employing 5000–9999. The lower
concentration of workforces with less than 250 employees cuts against the
prediction of a smaller workforce with greater ability for employee owners
to impact outcomes that we might expect to see under the
employee-focused hypothesis. The small size of the sample, however,
makes the differences easily discountable due to the similar distribution
patterns within the EO Fund portfolio companies and all survey portfolio
companies.
The patterns of portfolio company characteristics we observe in this
study are not consistent with the hypothesis that portfolio companies drive
inclusion of employee ownership provisions. Diverse companies without
observable commonalities are unlikely to face the same employee
challenges aligning incentives, sorting, or retaining talent. We did not
observe common features or clustering of portfolio companies throughout
our sample, as we would expect to see if their preferences—whether to
align interests,161 sort,162 or retain163 employees—were driving employee
ownership. Two documents stated employee-focused reasons for
including the employee ownership provisions: “providing long-term
incentives to current and future employees”164 or “to attract and incentivize
current and future employees.”165 This suggests that some impact
160. See, e.g., STAGARS, supra note 12, at 23.
161. Industry and location may indicate unique challenges aligning interests between employees
and the portfolio company, as would variables such as number of employees and stage of company
development.
162. Again, industry and location may indicate unique macro conditions with sorting challenges
conducive to employee ownership provisions.
163. Our portfolio workforce information is incomplete, but industry and development stage may
produce conditions conducive to retention concerns.
164. Document on file with authors.
165. Document on file with authors.
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investment portfolio companies act consistent with the literature-based
expectations, but we did not observe a pattern across our sample.166
B. Are Fund Preferences Driving EO Provisions?
Next we look to fund-level characteristics to explain the inclusion of
employee ownership provisions. Fund organizational features alone do not
explain the preference for employee ownership provisions. Five EO Funds
were organized as a limited partnership (or the equivalent) in their country
of organization but are organized in a variety of countries. The funds also
exhibited diverse geographic focus of investments.
We therefore turn to the hypotheses proposed in Section III(B) that
fund preferences may promote employee ownership provisions.
1. Financial Motivations
We observe fund-level patterns consistent with, but inconclusive of,
funds’ financial motivations for employee ownership.
a) Roll Up
Funds may be motivated to include employee ownership provisions
as a way to protect financial investment by promoting best practices in the
portfolio companies through aligned interests, sorting, and/or retaining
talented employees. Including employee ownership provisions may be a
way to protect financial investments and promote financial returns through
strong portfolio company performance. We have no direct evidence of this
motivation in our sample. Instead, we observed the strength of the EO
Fund’s contract terms protecting traditional venture capital financial and
governance rights. Within our sample overall we observed that impact
funds were likely to include contract terms that traditionally protected
financial interests and guaranteed governance rights to the investor. As
compared to our sample as a whole, EO Funds consistently demonstrated
higher occurrences of such terms including protective exit measures (put
options, redemption rights, and tag along rights), protective equity position
terms (rights of first refusals on third party stock sales, and preemptive and
anti-dilution rights), and governance rights (guaranteed seats on the
portfolio company board of directors, step in rights and veto/approval
166. Admittedly, our portfolio company information is limited in its scope. Additional data
points in the form of more survey participants providing portfolio company responses and more
portfolio company documents submitted by funds would enhance our inquiry into portfolio company
motivations for employee ownership. Additional workforce information such as turnover risk,
workforce age, employment rates, education and noncompete enforceability would all shed additional
light on the topic. Seeing no observable pattern within our sample; however, we turn to examine
fund-level motivations for employee ownership.
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rights). Additionally, we observed a slightly higher occurrence of
commitment fees paid by portfolio companies to EO Funds. Bolstering the
hypothesis that employee ownership may be one of many provisions
intended to protect investors’ financial interests, we also observed that
87% of EO Funds sought market-rate (rather than concessionary) returns
compared to 60% in our sample as a whole.
b) Discounting Through Option Shuffles
Some examples of employee ownership contract language support
the price discount hypothesis that EO Funds’ financial interests motivate
employee ownership provisions. Three out of seven EO funds allocated
options out of pre-money capitalization in one or more investment
contracts. This supports the theory that employee provisions can be a
means to discount the per-share price and protect the fund’s financial
investment. We observed ten responsive documents, or roughly 30%,
contained the discounting language. It is possible that our sample included
a higher (or lower) rate of discounting because an additional thirteen term
sheets (41%) contained incomplete information regarding how the option
pool would be created.
The strong traditional financial protections coupled with high
occurrence of targeted market-rate returns and observable pricing discount
through employee ownership plans suggest EO funds’ financial interests
may motivate the inclusion of employee ownership provisions in portfolio
company investment agreements.
2. Impact Motivations
The need to achieve nonpecuniary goals and balance those interests
with financial returns may create unique preferences for employee
ownership provisions among impact investment funds. We observe
fund-level patterns consistent with, but inconclusive of, fund impact
motivations for employee ownership.
a) Neutralizing Agency Costs
Funds may be unable to contract for their idiosyncratic preferred
balance between financial and nonpecuniary interests and seek to strike
the right balance through indirect contracting measures like aligning
employee interests through ownership plans. Our study was not structured
to directly observe this possible motivation. One can employ a model
along the lines of Bénabou & Tirole (2016)167 to show that when
167. Ronald Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and
Multitasking, 124 J. POL. ECON. 305, 314–16 (2016).
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employees have a higher utility for the firm’s mission than the VC does
(even if the VC also has utility from the mission goal), this drives the VC
to allocate a greater fraction of the company to share with employees.
b) Mission Lock on Portfolio Company
Our study observations offer some limited support for the mission
lock hypothesis. Impact investment funds screen investments, in part,
based upon portfolio company mission. Funds may want to ensure that the
mission is served during and after investment both to protect the fund’s
investment strategy and to achieve the fund’s nonpecuniary goals. Within
our EO Fund sample we observed a higher occurrence of investment in
portfolio companies structured to legally lock in the company’s mission:
57% compared to 47% and 39% in all document review and all survey
responses, respectively. The presence of legal structure lock may account
for the lower EO Fund occurrences of contract rights protecting mission
during investment or after exit. The higher incidence of legal mission lock
supports the hypothesis that employee ownership provisions are a means
for funds to serve nonpecuniary interests by giving mission-locked
employees partial ownership.
c) Measurable Fund Impact
Our final impact hypothesis states that funds with an express mission
to generate benefits related to employment (like income, ownership, job
creation, etc.) should be more likely to implement employee ownership
provisions than other types of funds. The low occurrence of observable
social metrics in our document review generally confounded our efforts to
support this hypothesis. We report mixed results. Only one EO Fund
documented employee-specific outcomes in fund-level documents
included in our review. We expanded our inquiry by reviewing fund
survey responses. EO Funds reported that 25% specifically target
investments that impact employees, a rate that mirrors the 27% of all funds
included in our document review.
On the other hand, EO Fund managers, when compared to the sample
of funds in our document review, were more likely to report that they were
required to consider social or environmental factors, as opposed to merely
given discretion to consider such factors. We also found support for this
hypothesis when analyzing portfolio company-intended impact.
Twenty-five percent of EO Funds reported portfolio company
commitment to income impact, compared with 11% of funds in our
document review sample and 20% of funds in the survey responses as a
whole. Thirty-seven percent of EO Funds reported portfolio company
commitment to job creation compared with 19% in our document review
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sample, and 27% for the survey responses generally. Thus, EO funds
tended to be more focused on income impact through their portfolio
companies. This is consistent with arguments that EO plans are a way to
address social inequality.168
C. Framing Observations, Implications and Next Steps
Our results as presented in this Article are limited in the following
respects. First, our sample size was relatively small. Second, our
instruments—both the survey and the document review—were
constructed based upon established contracting norms in private equity
and venture capital. This instrument may be too blunt to capture the full
scale of nuance of these contracts, omit emerging norms unique to this
space, or seek to measure a field that is too new to have norms around
which contracts can coalesce. Second, with regard to the “impact”
investment terms, these may be more opaque in the contracting process
due to a variety of reasons. Opacity of impact terms may reflect the
nascence of the field and the lack of standardization; lack of sophistication
with portfolio companies; greenwashing by funds; difficulty of creating
contract terms/benchmarks around individualized measures and
context-dependent outcomes; the negotiation phase (term sheets, not final
agreements), etc. To this last point, we think our study is particularly
relevant to informing the contracting norms and related literature. Third,
our document review relied heavily upon term sheets, which only cover
high level deal terms and provide neither a complete nor a thorough
description of the final contractual agreement. Thus, the sample of EO
Fund responsive documents may underrepresent the total number of
employee ownership provisions and other relevant contract terms analyzed
in this study in the final agreements. Finally, for survey responses, the
funds self-reported for themselves and on behalf of the portfolio
companies—a process which can be subject to bias and errors.169
Acknowledging these caveats, we believe that this is a pioneering
review of contract terms in the impact investment space. Through this
study we gained unparalleled access to private agreements and a rare
window under the hood of an emerging investment product largely
shielded from public view. We report our findings with the aim of
identifying contract norms and motivations for private ordering solutions
168. Strom, supra note 4; Ittner, supra note 102, at 92; see also Hand, supra note 102, at 398;
Gavis, supra note 101, at 1486 (“[I]t is apparent that Congress established leveraged ESOPs in order
to address perceived inequities in the distribution of capital throughout the economy.”).
169. See, e.g., Stewart Donaldson & Elisa J. Grant-Vallone, Understanding Self-Report Bias in
Organizational Behavior Research, 17 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 245, 247 (2002) (describing self-reporting
bias, particularly in the business setting).
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documented in our study and with the hope of beginning a concrete
discussion of practices in the impact investing space.170
CONCLUSION
We reviewed a unique sample of contracts pertaining to private
equity impact funds and their portfolio companies. We observed EO
funds’ consistent utilization of traditional private equity and VC
contracting terms to protect their financial interests in portfolio companies
through strong governance, exit, anti-dilution, and financial rights.
Contracting norms regarding nonpecuniary interests were harder to
observe with the methods employed in our study, and will be the subject
of future work in the space.
The clustering of employee ownership provisions within some
impact funds, but not others, formed our main inquiry in this Article.
Employee ownership plans emerged as a recurring condition for joint
agreements between impact funds and portfolio companies. Given the
unique context of impact investment’s dual goals, we wanted to explore
the role of employee ownership in this type of private contracting. We
began by reviewing existing theories for why companies may wish to
implement these shared ownership plans. We then proposed a new set of
hypotheses for why funds might request employee ownership plans,
relating to both financial and impact goals.
Our document review did not yield any striking patterns among EO
responsive portfolio companies or portfolio companies invested in by EO
Funds, in terms of their location, development stage, industrial focus, and
size. This supports company-level theories of EO plans. The lack of
clustering of these companies around common characteristics suggests
that fund-level considerations may have been drivers of EO inclusion in
our sample.
Fund-level patterns provided some limited support for new theories
of EO plans, although the size of the sample prevents any definitive
conclusions. As compared to our sample as a whole, EO Funds
consistently demonstrated higher occurrences of such terms including
protective exit measures, protective equity position terms, and governance
rights, and were more likely to seek market-rate returns, suggesting that
fund-level financial considerations may have played a role.

170. In future research generated from this same set of impact investment documents, we hope
to explore more broadly contracting norms in impact investment. We are particularly interested in
provisions related to social and environmental benefit contracting and in documenting the ways in
which impact investment documents conform to or deviate from contracting norms in traditional
private equity and venture capital agreements.
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Additionally, the structure of some of the employee ownership plans
was consistent with dilution of the entrepreneur, bolstering the idea that
EO Funds acted in a financially savvy fashion.
There was also evidence of less cynical motives for employee
ownership plans. In particular, contractually binding mission lock was
more common among EO Funds, raising the possibility that impact funds
see employee ownership plans as another way to lock in mission. Another
remarkable pattern was the higher incidence of income and job-creation
focus among EO Fund portfolio companies, along with survey responses
that EO Fund managers were required to consider social or environmental
factors. EO Fund managers may see employee ownership plans as a tool
to fulfill their impact goals directly. That being said, we note that only one
EO Fund documented employee-specific outcomes in fund-level
documents, and EO Funds were no more likely to specifically target
investments that impact employees than the overall sample.
Our results do not eschew portfolio company motivations for
employee ownership plans. Companies may want them to align, sort, and
retain employees. In the unique context of impact investments where
investors and portfolio companies are balancing financial and
nonpecuniary interests, we did not observe portfolio company patterns
that, alone, explain the inclusion of these provisions. Employee ownership
provisions were not randomly strewn throughout our document review but
were clustered within several funds, suggesting that fund-level
motivations might explain or contribute to the motivations for employee
ownership provisions. In the expanded matrix of motivations at play—
financial and benefit for both investor and company—we observed
patterns that suggest fund-level motivations for employee ownership
provisions serving financial and impact goals.
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APPENDIX A: SELECTED SURVEY QUESTIONS
Survey Variable 33: Whether the fund has GIIRS rating data and is
willing to share it with the WSII?
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
Survey Variable 36: The statement that best describes the fund's
financial return goals:
Answer option(s):
 Targeting competitive, market rate returns
 Targeting below market, but close to market returns
 Targeting below market, close to capital preservation returns
 Not Applicable (Explain)
Survey Variable 37: Text explanation of a 'Not Applicable' response.
Answer option(s): text
Survey Variable 39: The statement that best describes the fund's
approach to creating social and environmental impact.
Answer option(s):
 We aim to create social or environmental impact by improving
the operations of the companies in which we invest.
 We invest in business models that specifically create positive
social or environmental impact.
 Neither of the above (Explain)
Survey Variable 40: Text explanation of a 'Neither' response.
Answer option(s): text
Survey Variable 41: Whether the fund's Private Placement
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other
comparable investment agreements include specific language that
“Requires fund manager to consider social and/or environmental
practices when making investment decisions”:
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
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Survey Variable 42: Whether the fund's Private Placement
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other
comparable investment agreements include specific language that
“Explicitly allows the fund manager to consider social practices
when making investment decisions”:
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
Survey Variable 43: Whether the fund's Private Placement
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other
comparable investment agreements include specific language that
“Explicitly allows the fund manager to consider environmental
practices when making investment decisions”:
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
Survey Variable 44: Whether the fund's Private Placement
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other
comparable investment agreements include specific language that
“Does not reference social and/or environmental issues”:
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
Survey Variable 112: What % of the fund's invested capital has
included language or a covenant in the investment agreement that
allows the fund to divest early if the mission of the investment or
business model changes during the investment lifetime?
Answer option(s):
 0
 1–24%
 25–49%
 50–74%
 75%+
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Survey Variable 113: What % of the total fund is invested in
companies that have a written legal governance structure that locks
in the mission, requiring consideration of its stakeholders
(community, environment, suppliers, employees)?
Answer option(s):
 0
 1–24%
 25–49%
 50–74%
 75%+
Survey Variable 115: For what % of your divestments/exits has
there been a contract with the acquirer regarding the ongoing social
and environmental performance of the company? Choose N/A only if
your fund has not had any exits.
Answer option(s):
 N/A
 1–24%
 25–49%
 50–74%
 75%+
Survey Variable 166: The industry of the Company
Answer option(s): text
Survey Variable 167: The number of full-time employees of the
company:
Answer option(s):
 0
 1–19
 20–99
 100–249
 250–499
 500–999
 1000–2499
 2500–4999
 5000–9999
 10,000–24,999
 25,000–49,000
 50,000–99,999
 100,000+
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Survey Variable 168: Which of the following best reflects the
development status that company has attained?
Answer option(s):
 Product Development
 Beta
 Deploying Product/Service
 Profitable
 Not applicable (Explain)
Survey Variable 182: Describe the social impact focus of the
company: Employment generation
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
Survey Variable 188: Describe the social impact focus of the
company: Income/productivity growth
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
Survey Variable 189: Describe the social impact focus of the
company: Job creation
Answer option(s):
 Yes
 No
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